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FINDING THE GOOD IN HOLMES’S BAD MAN
Marco Jimenez*
This Article critically examines Oliver Wendell Holmes’s widely
influential but controversial “bad man” theory of law from its inception
during a speech Holmes gave for the dedication of a new hall of the Boston
University School of Law in 1897, through its development over the next
century, to its current influence over legal fields as diverse as contract law,
tort law, and modern punitive damages jurisprudence. This Article argues
that Holmes’s theory, despite its extraordinary influence, has been widely
misunderstood and can be more profitably understood—by both supporters
and critics alike—not as supporting the bad man but the good, by providing
an effective counterpart to the traditional positivist theory of law for which
Holmes’s bad man theory has so often been associated. Indeed, Holmes’s
theory, which has been portrayed by some as supporting the argument for
the strict separation of law and morality, has been attacked by its critics
both descriptively (as providing an incomplete picture of the law) and
normatively (as providing an immoral or, at best, amoral theory of law)
and has been accused of artificially driving a wedge between law on the
one hand, and justice or morality on the other. Far from overlooking this
relationship, however, a careful reading of Holmes suggests that he was
himself well aware of the intimate relationship between law and morality,
and seems to have recognized, somewhat surprisingly, that only by
engaging in an analytical separation of these two concepts can they then be
normatively reunited in an intellectually consistent and satisfying manner.
In short, Holmes’s theory supports the idea that only by recognizing the
differences between the concepts of law and justice, rather than by stressing
their similarities, can the two be brought together and integrated into the
social fabric upon which law must necessarily rest.
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INTRODUCTION
In one of the most cited 1 and important 2 law review articles ever
written, 3 Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated his path-breaking and widely
influential 4 theory of law, 5 in which he sought to help lawyers, judges, and
1. See, e.g., David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on
Holmes’s The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1548 (1997) (“Path has been
republished and cited so many times that few of us remember that it began as a speech,
rather than an essay on jurisprudence.”).
2. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (and Toward
Critical Legal Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1221,
1228 (1991) (book review) (describing The Path of the Law as “the single most important
essay ever written by an American on the law”).
3. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
4. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE BALANCE: THE CASE AGAINST
NATURALISM IN SCIENCE, LAW & EDUCATION 140 (1995) (“This lecture has been so
influential in shaping the thinking of American lawyers that it might be described as almost
part of the Constitution.”).
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academicians understand the law by viewing it not from the internal
perspective of a good man, “who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience,” 6 but
from the external perspective of the “bad man,” 7 who “cares only for the
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict.” 8
Since its creation in 1897, Holmes’s “bad man” theory of law has been
accused (among other things) of advocating a legal system devoid of
morality, 9 one that not only leaves the law itself impoverished, 10 but
promotes immoral behavior by encouraging the bad man (or his lawyer) 11
to choose a course of conduct not according to generally accepted standards
of community behavior, 12 but according to a cost-benefit analysis 13 in
5. Holmes once defined law as “a statement of the circumstances, in which the public
force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts. . . . [T]he word commonly is
confined to such prophecies or threats . . . addressed to persons living within the power of
the courts.” Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
6. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
7. Although this author would have preferred to use the non-sexist terms “good person”
and “bad person,” I have retained the terms “good man” and “bad man” in this Article
because they are ubiquitous in Holmes’s own writings and are used by judges and scholars
discussing Holmes’s work.
8. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459. Here, Holmes acknowledges both the “internal” and
“external” ways of viewing the law, about which I shall have a lot more to say in Part III.
For a general statement of the internal and external points of view, see H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994) (“[F]or it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either
merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which
accepts and uses them as guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the ‘external’
and the ‘internal points of view.’”).
9. See Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014
(1997) (“Probably the most common reading of the speech is that it sets forth a purely
positivist theory of law—a deflated, de-moralized, ‘disenchanted’ view . . . of the legal
system.”).
10. See, e.g., William Twining, Other People’s Power: The Bad Man and English
Positivism, 1897–1997, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 189, 192 (1997) (“[The Path of the Law] is the
classic text of legal positivism which also lives on as a sitting target for some powerful lines
of criticism—it is at once a talisman and a target within the positivist tradition. This is
especially true of the ‘bad man’ as he is sometimes treated as a symbol of a radically
impoverished view of law.”); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 14 (1986) (calling
“external theories,” which he associated with Holmes, “perverse,” “impoverished[,] and
defective”).
11. See Nelson P. Miller, The Nobility of the American Lawyer: The Ennobling History,
Philosophy, and Morality of a Maligned Profession, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 209, 231
(2005) (“Justice Holmes desired most of all that lawyers disconnect themselves from
morality—to destroy their morality and faith.”).
12. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1014 (“To less approving eyes, Holmes recommends
that the lawyer regard the legal system in a wholly alienated and instrumental fashion—not
as a set of norms established for common membership in a political community, nor an
attempt to realize (however imperfectly) ideals of justice or social integration, but simply as
random and arbitrary outputs of state force, which are opportunities for or obstacles to
realizing his client’s self-interested projects.”).
13. This, of course, is the way that many law and economics scholars understand
Holmes today, and their view is not without support in Holmes himself. See Holmes, supra
note 3, at 474 (“[W]e are called on to consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means
of attaining them, and the cost. We learn that for everything we have to give up something
else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, and
to know what we are doing when we elect.”). As I discuss in Part III, this view, while part of
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which the bad man chooses to engage in a given activity whenever the
benefit of doing so exceeds the activity’s legal cost. 14
In this Article, I argue that this commonly accepted view of Holmes’s
legal theory is not only wrong, but dangerous. In short, I will show how
scholars and judges have erected around Holmes’s mighty reputation a
jurisprudential edifice built upon the shifting sands of misunderstanding,
and how this misunderstanding has led some judges, including most
recently our own Supreme Court, to base some of their most important
decisions on a misinterpretation of Holmes.
If, however, Holmes’s theory, even as misunderstood and misapplied,
had an independent normative and descriptive force, then one could still
defend this corrupted version of Holmes’s theory as logically coherent, and
its influence on our law, although not in accord with Holmes’s original
intent, could still be justified. As I will show, however, no such
justification is possible. This does not mean, of course, that Holmes’s bad
man theory of law, especially as understood by Holmes, is not valuable.
Indeed, as this Article shows, Holmes himself had a much narrower
understanding of the bad man’s role in jurisprudence than is commonly
supposed. In fact, Holmes’s bad man, when coupled with other important
insights provided throughout Holmes’s writings, not only sows the seeds for
the bad man’s demise (at least to the extent that the bad man theory of law
is commonly understood today), but provides a much fuller and more
satisfactory theory of law than has been previously acknowledged—one
capable of speaking to us in a meaningful way today.
This Article therefore revisits Holmes’s bad man theory of law as it was
originally conceived. It then shows how the bad man theory has come to be
misunderstood and misapplied in several important areas of law, including
contract law, tort law, and punitive damages jurisprudence. Finally, this
Article suggests ways in which a fuller understanding of Holmes’s theory
can shed light on important questions of law and legal policy today.
This Article proceeds in three principle parts. Part I paints, in broad
strokes, Holmes’s bad man theory of law, as it has been commonly
understood. Part II discusses how this misunderstood version of the theory
has been misapplied in the areas of contract law, tort law, and, most
recently, the law governing punitive damages. Part II then demonstrates
how these developments have infected our law by pitting Holmes’s
corrupted version of the bad man against the more noble “good man” view
of law, in which morality and ethics exist within, and alongside, the blackletter law. Part III revisits Holmes’s bad man theory of law in order to
Holmes’s philosophy, is incomplete and only tells part of the story Holmes wished to
convey.
14. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1014 (“To those who like this view, the ‘bad man’ is just
the rational man—Homo law-and-economicus—who treats all legal rules as prices on
conduct.”); see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1773 (1976) (“The certainty of individualism is perfectly embodied in
the calculations of Holmes’ ‘bad man,’ who is concerned with law only as a means or an
obstacle to the accomplishment of his antisocial ends.”).
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reinterpret it in light of Aristotle, an interpretation for which there is strong
textual support. Part III then suggests a new way of understanding
Holmes’s theory that is fundamentally at odds with, but more intellectually
and morally satisfying than, most modern interpretations.
More
specifically, Part III argues that this mixed Aristotelian/Holmesian theory
may help provide judges, academicians, and policymakers with a useful
tool for making and examining important decisions for the benefit of the
good man. Part III then briefly sketches the usefulness of such a theory in
the areas of contract law, tort law, and punitive damages.
It is important to note that, throughout this Article, I will not be calling
for the bad man’s death or overthrow. Rather, I ask, as Holmes did, that we
endeavor to understand the bad man, learn from him what he will teach us
and, ultimately, see the world—if only for a moment—through his eyes.
But we must do this not to placate the bad man, but to better fashion, from
deep within our laboratories of justice, a more suitable rival. This rival,
when he is ready to rule, will not displace the bad man from his throne of
law, but will take his place alongside him, on the throne of justice.
I. THE BIRTH OF A THEORY: HOLMES INTRODUCES THE BAD MAN
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.

— Oliver Wendell Holmes 15
With these immortal words, Holmes, who was perhaps the greatest jurist
this country ever produced,16 breathed life into what was arguably his most
enduring contribution to jurisprudence: the “bad man.”
According to the most common reading of Holmes’s theory, law should
be approached and understood as the bad man himself would approach and
understand it: that is, not as an historically minded rational man concerned
with the reasons for the existence of a particular law, nor as a morally
driven good man “who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law

15. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
16. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 677, 684 (1931)
(“He is today for all students of the law and for all students of human society the philosopher
and the seer, the greatest of our age in the domain of jurisprudence, and one of the greatest of
the ages.”); Felix Frankfurter, The Early Writings of O.W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV.
717, 723 (1931) (“[Holmes], above all others, has given the directions of contemporary
jurisprudence. He wields such a powerful influence upon today, because his deep
knowledge of yesterday enables him to extricate the present from meaningless
entanglements with the past and yet to see events in the perspective of history.”); Roscoe
Pound, Judge Holmes’s Contributions to the Science of Law, 34 HARV. L. REV. 449, 449
(1921) (“[Holmes] has done more than lead American juristic thought of the present
generation. Above all others he has shaped the methods and ideas that are characteristic of
the present as distinguished from the immediate past.”).
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or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience,” 17 but rather as a
calculating and amoral (or perhaps, immoral) bad man who, in Holmes’s
own words, “cares only for the material consequences”18 of his actions,
which can be thought of as the difference between the advantages to be
gained and the penalty to be suffered by violating this or that provision of
the law, breaching this or that contract, or committing this or that tort.19
If Holmes’s views constituted the mere ramblings of an obscure scholar
writing more than a century ago, then all could be forgiven, as much would
be forgotten. But Holmes’s bad man, like Dr. Frankenstein’s own
creation, 20 soon took on a life of his own, and has been terrorizing the
Anglo-American legal landscape ever since, spreading his unsavory
influence to fields as disparate as contract law,21 tort law, 22 and the law
governing punitive damages. 23 And, more than a century after his birth, the
bad man is alive and well today and has recently made his presence felt in
state 24 and federal 25 judicial decisions, books, 26 law review articles, 27 and,
17. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1211, 1213 (2006) (“Law for the bad man is a yoke around his neck that restrains him
from various liberties he might otherwise wish to enjoy. It also constrains his ability to
benefit himself and to further his various ends; including ends of survival and physical wellbeing. He has no sense of legal duty and would think nothing of violating the law if he could
do so with impunity. The only restraint on illegality is the possibility of detection, which he
would constantly weigh against the potential for gain.”).
20. See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR THE MODERN
PROMETHEUS (James Rieger ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) (1818).
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. See State v. Creekpaum, 732 P.2d 557, 569 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459) (finding that the Ex Post Facto Clause was intended to protect
the bad man from unknown punishment), rev’d, 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1988); Neufeld v.
Balboa Ins. Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (finding the bad man
insurance company could not act as the “bad insurer” and seek to use its own wrong,
including the flouting of time limit disclosure regulations, as an affirmative defense in later
litigation); Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim, No. X06CV040184523S, 2008 WL
4926925, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2008) (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631–32 (2008)); In re W.D.P., 91 P.3d 1078, 1089–92 (Haw. 2004)
(finding that for attorneys and future bar applicants, “bad man”-like behavior may be legal
but may also cause failure of admission requirement of good moral character); Sorci v. Iowa
Dist. Court for Polk Cnty., 671 N.W.2d 482, 494 (Iowa 2003) (finding the Iowa Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers is not designed for Holmes’s bad man); State v.
Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 267–68 (Minn. 1996) (declining to rule that warrantless entry into a
suspect’s home can only be predicated on a felony, used in the DUI context as against public
policy to incentivize evasions from the police for minor stops); Estate of Murrell v. Quin,
454 So. 2d 437, 440–41 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citing Holmes’s bad man and the contrasting purposes of equity and contract law); Tideway
Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 466 & n.4 (Miss. 1983) (finding a Mississippi
Chancery court is allowed to grant punitive damages and that the “bad man” could foresee
the possibility of paying such damages); Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 416 A.2d 852, 857 (N.J.
1980) (“‘[T]he Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’s proverbial
‘bad man’ who wants to know just how many corners he may cut . . . .’” (quoting Gen.
Motors Corp. v. City of N.Y., 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974))); Havana Cent. NY2 LLC
v. Lunney’s Pub, Inc., 852 N.Y.S.2d 32, 37 & n.1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (McGuire, J.,
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concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding a contract provision relieving a landlord of
liability for failure to give possession on commencement date is equivalent to term stating
landlord is not required to give possession of the premises if unable to do so); Terrazas v.
Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 732 n.2 (Tex. 1991) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (noting that “the
constraints of law are not primarily designed for persons with good intentions”).
25. Castro-Cortez v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 1037, 1054 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that even the
bad man has a right to know what the penalty will be); Gray-Bey v. United States, 201 F.3d
866, 872 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1994);
United States v. Bruchhausen, 977 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1992) (Fernandez, J., concurring)
(writing against bad man action in property contracts); Eugene D. ex rel. Olivia D. v.
Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 714 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1989); Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767,
774 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding, contrary to Holmes’s view in The Path of the Law that “[t]he
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law,” Holmes, supra note 3, at 461, “there may be ‘law’ without a judicial remedy”);
Gen. Motors, 501 F.2d at 649 (finding the Code of Professional Responsibility is not
designed for the bad man); Delso v. Trs. for Ret. Plan For Hourly Emps. of Merck & Co.,
Inc., No. 04-3009 (AET), 2007 WL 766349, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (finding the Code of
Professional Responsibility is not designed for the bad man); Norcia v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1047–48 (D. Ariz. 2000) (finding that
when a bad man breaches a contract the only punishment is to pay damages and nothing
else); Essex Cnty. Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F. Supp. 2d 418, 437 (D.N.J. 1998)
(citing General Motors, 501 F.2d at 649); Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp.,
No. 96 Civ. 1103 (MBM), 1996 WL 125641, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996) (quoting
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459); Secs. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146, 156 (D.
Mass. 1988); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D.
Mass. 1985) (citing Holmes’s bad man theory and Holmes’s maxim that a breach of contract
requires payment of damages and nothing more), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 855 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1988); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 802 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(citing bad man in the conflict between equity and contract maxims), vacated, 491 F.2d 402
(3d Cir. 1974).
26. See, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000) (providing a generally negative account of Holmes’s
provocatively amoral approach to understanding the law and the influence of his thought in
American jurisprudence); THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Robert W.
Gordon ed., 1992); THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Steven J. Burton ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (a collection of
essays by American and Canadian scholars on the legacy of Holmes’s famous essay, with
particular discussion of the bad man by several contributors). References to the bad man
theory of law are made in too numerous a quantity to list exhaustively, but a representative
example includes David O. Brink, Legal Interpretation, Objectivity, and Morality, in
OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 12, 14–15 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001); STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 108 (2000); NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND
METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: BASIC TOOLS FOR NORMATIVE REASONING 80–81
(2005); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 126–27, 146 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One
Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353 (1997) (reviewing The Path of the Law); David
Campbell, The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-operation as the Implicit Second
Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 455, 461–62
(2005) (writing on the bad man and efficient breach); Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to
Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1593 (2006) (writing on corporations acting as the bad man); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989) [hereinafter Grey, Legal Pragmatism]
(writing that good lawyers must themselves be bad men); Thomas C. Grey, Plotting The
Path of the Law, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 19, 21 (1997) (noting that The Path of the Law was born
of a speech and Holmes’s words were written to be memorable more than making their
interrelations clear); David Howarth, Many Duties of Care—or a Duty of Care? Notes from
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most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States itself,28 where he has
asserted himself in a particularly pernicious manner.29 That such an
ominous theory has made its way to the highest levels of our judiciary
should give us pause to reflect on this theory that now informs much of our
law. 30
the Underground, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 449–50 (2006) (discussing the bad man
and Holmes’s breach of contract theory in light of tort law); Irving R. Kaufman, The Former
Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957)
(writing on the professional canons of ethics and the role of the bad man in legal ethics);
Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in the
Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 382
(2006) (noting corporations and individuals act as the bad man with respect to the Tax
Code); Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, The “Bad Man,” the Good, and the Self-Reliant, 78
B.U. L. REV. 885 (1998) (arguing that Holmes’s bad man is a bad metaphor and is more
profitably replaced by the Emersonian self-reliant individual); Luban, supra note 1
(discussing Holmes’s prediction theory, morality in the law, and the relationship between
punitive damages and the bad man); Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, The Supremes’
“Reflections” on Punitive Damages: The Constitutional Dimension of Tort Reform, 61
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 864, 878–79 (2007) (mentioning the Supreme Court’s use of the
bad man in discussing punitive damages in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker); Miller, supra note
11 (discussing the role of morals in the legal profession and the place of the bad man in law);
Liam Murphy, Better To See the Law This Way, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1088 (2008) (supporting
lawyers who take the bad man view to better represent clients); Richard A. Posner, The Path
Away from the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1039 (1997) (analyzing the importance of Holmes
and The Path of the Law 100 years after its publication); David J. Seipp, Holmes’s Path, 77
B.U. L. REV. 515 (1997) (reviewing The Path of The Law 100 years after publication); David
Simon & Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the Buyer’s Market Damages to Lost Profits: A
Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1433 (1979)
(“Perhaps the best way to appraise the court’s foreseeability theory is to see how it would
operate in the hands of Justice Holmes’ classic ‘bad man.’” (citing Holmes, supra note 3));
Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of
Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 9–10 (2005) (finding the bad man in the context of
marriage and divorce); William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 275
(1973) (exploring the bad man as one standpoint providing a useful tool of juristic analysis);
Twining, supra note 10 (decrying unscholarly and inaccurate characterizations of the bad
man and arguing he was not meant as a role model but as a device to speak about the
difference between law and morality, a discussion which remains controversial); Louise
Weinberg, Holmes’ Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1997) (commenting on Holmes’s legacy
and work, including The Path of the Law); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as
Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005) (discussing the bad man and the role of
lawyers in the Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom and other corporate financial scandals);
T. Patrick Gumkowski, Comment, Protecting the Integrity of the Rhode Island Judicial
System and Assuring an Adequate Remedy for Victims of Spoliation: Why an Independent
Cause of Action for the Spoliation of Evidence is the Solution, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 795, 815–16 (2005) (discussing the present state of Rhode Island spoliation law and
how it encourages a bad man reading of the statute); Jay E. Rivlin, Note, Recognizing an
Independent Tort Action Will Spoil a Spoliator’s Splendor, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003 (1998)
(offering a solution to the issue of insufficient punishment of the spoliation of evidence and
to prevent bad man behavior); Matthew T. Sanderson, Note, Voodoo Economics: A Look
Abroad for a Supply-Side Solution to America’s Campaign-Finance Riddle, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 937, 943 (2008) (finding the bad man in campaign-finance).
28. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (finding that punitive
damages should not be so high as to prevent an agent—like the bad man himself—from
being able to predict the cost of violating the law).
29. See infra Part II.C.
30. It should be noted that, while the bad man is typically viewed in a negative light,
there are times in which he has been used by courts in what many would agree is a positive
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So who, exactly, is the bad man, and what, if anything, can he offer to the
study of law?
Many commentators have viewed the bad man as a basic extension of
Holmes himself; 31 that is to say, as a gruff character indifferent to matters
of justice, and either apathetic or downright opposed to the establishment of
any connection between law and morality. 32 And, although Holmes’s own
views on the matter were much more nuanced,33 Holmes himself was at
least partly to blame for these depictions. For instance, Holmes encouraged
his audience to understand law as the bad man himself would understand it,
and that meant, first and foremost, to “dispel a confusion between morality
and law” 34 by purging the legal vernacular of all words of moral
significance. In Holmes’s words: “For my own part, I often doubt whether
it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be
banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which should
convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.” 35
way. For instance, some courts have cited this theory for the proposition that individuals in
our society are not allowed to act as the bad man would. See Holmquist, 36 F.3d at 160
(using statutory construction to avoid promoting a bad man reading of the statute);
Bruchhausen, 977 F.2d at 469 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (warning against allowing bad
man to take property, regardless of bad man’s willingness to pay market value for the
property); Eugene, 889 F.2d at 711–15 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (arguing against the bad man
and the positivist position); Gen. Motors, 501 F.2d at 649 (holding the Rules of Professional
Conduct are not meant to be read from the perspective of the bad man); Delso, 2007 WL
766349, at *5 (“[T]he Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes
proverbial ‘bad man’ . . . .” (quoting Gen. Motors, 501 F.2d at 649)); People v. Peevy, 953
P.2d 1212, 1214 (Cal. 1998) (holding law enforcement agents are not allowed to act as the
bad man and choose when to obey the rules with regard to an accused’s rights); id. at 1230
(Mosk, J., concurring) (finding police officers and agencies are not free to act as the bad man
would and cannot choose whether to give Miranda rights and thus make defendant
statements admissible, or not give Miranda and make defendant statements inadmissible);
Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 356–57 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that when conduct is proscribed by law, the state should never act as the
bad man).
31. Seipp, supra note 27, at 552 (“Holmes was ‘the bad man.’”).
32. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV.
929, 932 (1951).
33. See, e.g., ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW: FROM HOLMESIAN
REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM 22 (2005) (arguing that Holmes’s theory “depicted
a system that was both principled and policy-driven, faulty and fault-free and moral and
amoral, all at the same time”). For a more in-depth discussion of Holmes’s views, see Part
III, infra.
34. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459; see also id. at 458 (“One of the many evil effects of
the confusion between legal and moral ideas . . . is that theory is apt to get the cart before the
horse, and to consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and independent
of the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added afterward.”); id. at
464.
35. Id. at 464. Indeed, while discussing the “confusion between legal and moral ideas,”
particularly in the area of contract law, Holmes famously remarked that
[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else. . . . But such a mode of looking
at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as
much ethics into the law as they can.
Id. at 462. As I discuss in Part III, however, Holmes was not against morality informing law,
and understood too well that the legitimacy of law itself rested on public morality. Holmes’s
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But requiring one to leave morality at justice’s door probably seemed as
inauspicious then as it does now, and it is but one short step from such a
statement to the now widely accepted view that Holmes’s bad man theory
of law stands for the principle that lawyers, judges, and lawmakers should
not concern themselves at all with matters of morality when advising
clients, interpreting a statute, or enacting new legislation. 36
To see why, let us examine how a bad man might understand a concept
such as “duty,” a term laden with both moral and legal significance. In the
words of Holmes: “[W]hat does [a legal duty] mean to a bad man? Mainly,
and in the first place, a prophecy that if he does certain things he will be
subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or
compulsory payment of money.” 37
Holmes continues:
What significance is there in calling one taking right and another wrong
from the point of view of the law? It does not matter, so far as the given
consequence, the compulsory payment, is concerned, whether the act to
which it is attached is described in terms of praise or in terms of blame, or
whether the law purports to prohibit it or to allow it. If it matters at all,
still speaking from the bad man’s point of view, it must be because in one
case and not in the other some further disadvantages, or at least some
further consequences, are attached to the act by the law. 38

In short,
[t]o a Holmesian bad man, law is a system of prices, and only material
prices matter. The law’s price may include damages, an injunction, a

point in making this comment is that legal ideas could be better understood if legal and
ethical concepts, especially those concepts unfortunate enough to be identified with the same
linguistic marking (e.g., the word “duty”), were disentangled.
36. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 27, at 420; Hart, supra note 32, at 932 (replying to
Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951),
Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. states: “The conclusion . . . is that law is something entirely
separate from morals, and that to see law truly we must look at it the way a bad man does.
Why that helps, unless to make us more effective counselors of evil, I have never
understood.”). Professor Albert W. Alschuler is deeply critical of what he perceives as
Holmes’s project to separate morals from the law:
At the conclusion of a tour of Holmes’ dark, elegant, engaging, and destructive
essay, however, the praise seems flawed. Morton Horwitz’s judgment appears
more appropriate: “With ‘The Path of the Law’ Holmes pushed American legal
thought into the twentieth century.” The only flaw in this pronouncement is that
Horwitz apparently meant it as a compliment to Holmes, to the century, and to
American law.
Alschuler, supra note 27, at 420 (quoting MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 142 (1992)).
37. Holmes, supra note 3, at 461; see also 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932, at 212–
13 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) (“So we get up the empty substratum, a right, to pretend
to account for the fact that the courts will act in a certain way. . . . I think our morally tinted
words have caused a great deal of confused thinking.”); Holmes, supra note 3, at 458 (“[A]
legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he
will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;—and so of a legal
right.”).
38. Holmes, supra note 3, at 461.
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contempt citation, a fine, a prison term, or even death by hanging.
Nevertheless, a man tough enough to pay the price always has the option
of noncompliance with the law’s directives. 39

Indeed, juxtaposing Holmes’s bad man view of law with an alternative
“good man” view of law may help bring into sharper focus what many
believe to be at stake in adopting Holmes’s judicial philosophy. A good
man, as Holmes stated, will rely on his “conscience” to guide his behavior
and will presumably do the right thing—not because it is illegal to do
otherwise—but simply because it is the right thing to do. When deciding
whether to obey a particular law, for example, the good man will not look
to the penalty that may be imposed in the case of violation. Rather, the
good man will look to the rightness or wrongness of the action at issue and
will undertake just actions even where it is unprofitable to do so (e.g.,
performing a losing contract) while violating unjust laws without regard to
the penalty imposed (e.g., Jim Crow laws).
Because the bad man is motivated by external sanctions, while the good
man is motivated by internal conscience, a lawyer, judge, or legislator
advising a client, interpreting a statute, or making a new law may behave
quite differently depending on whether he or she has the good man or bad
man in mind. For instance, a lawmaker with the good man before his mind
would likely attempt to “establish wholesome laws in a state” in order to
make “his citizens virtuous,” 40 whereas a legislator with the bad man before
his mind would not worry much about appealing to his constituent’s hearts
by enacting laws to make his citizens more virtuous, but would likely
appeal to their minds by attaching sufficiently large penalties to laws
deemed important enough to enforce.
Putting aside Holmes’s own intentions for the moment, 41 one may have a
hard time seeing what the “bad man” theory of law, at least as it is
commonly understood today, has to offer at all to legal analysis, especially
when juxtaposed with the more benign and noble “good man” theory of
law. One commentator, for example, described Holmes’s bad man theory
of law as one that would, if widely adopted, “breed disrespect for law by
encouraging the public to act like Holmes’ bad man,” whereas a “good
man” view would encourage individuals to uphold “an obligation to
conform to a norm.” 42 And, in helping their clients behave in this manner,
39. Alschuler, supra note 27, at 412.
40. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. III, ch. IX, 1280b, at 82 (Ernest Rhys ed.,
William Ellis trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1912) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“[W]hosoever endeavours to
establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual
who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the first care of him who would found a city
. . . must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an alliance for selfdefence; differing from those of the same cast which are made between different people only
in place: for law is an agreement and a pledge . . . between the citizens of their intending to
do justice to each other . . . .”).
41. I discuss Holmes’s intentions in greater detail in Part III.
42. Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 687 (1995)
(“The prediction model, if widely accepted, would breed disrespect for law by encouraging
the public to act like Holmes’ bad man, understanding the law as imposing an obligation not
to get caught, rather than an obligation to conform to a norm.”).
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lawyers advising the bad man, unlike those advising the good man, would
in time become “more effective counsellors of evil,” 43 and with enough
practice, would help bring about Holmes’s sinister desire to “destroy their
morality and faith.” 44 So again, what benefits can the bad man view of law
offer to legal analysis?
Quite a few, as it turns out. To examine more closely the bad man’s
contribution to modern jurisprudence, this Article examines the bad man
theory’s influence in three important legal fields: contract law, tort law, and
punitive damages jurisprudence. In each of these fields, this Article draws
heavily on the work done by law and economics scholars, who have
probably made the most use of Holmes’s bad man. 45 By doing so, we will
see the strong influence the bad man has had not only on academicians, but
on judges deciding actual disputes, making it even more important that they
get the theory right.
II. FROM HOLMES’S THEORY OF THE BAD MAN TO THE BAD MAN’S
THEORY OF LAW
What constitutes the law? You will find some text writers telling you that
it is something different from what is decided by the courts[,] . . . that it is
a system of reason, that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or
admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide with the
decisions. But if we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find
that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he
does want to know what the . . . courts are likely to do in fact. I am much
of his mind. The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.

—Oliver Wendell Holmes 46
This part of the Article traces the influence of Holmes’s bad man theory
in three important areas of our law. Section A traces the development of
Holmes’s bad man theory of contracts from its inception in Holmes’s article
43. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 32, at 932 (replying to Howe, supra note 36: “The
conclusion . . . is that law is something entirely separate from morals, and that to see law
truly we must look at it the way a bad man does. Why that helps, unless to make us more
effective counsellors of evil, I have never understood.”).
44. See Miller, supra note 11, at 231 (claiming “Justice Holmes desired most of all that
lawyers disconnect themselves from morality—to destroy their morality and faith”).
45. In fact, Holmes’s bad man approach to law was probably carried to its highest level
of abstraction in the writings of Ronald Coase. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19–28 (1960); see also Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of
Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 931 n.15 (1994) (arguing that Coase’s seminal
article “presents an essentially Holmesian understanding of law as without fundamental
obligatoriness: Holmes’s famous proposal to understand law from the position of the ‘bad
man’ follows this reasoning, as does his treatment of contract as presenting an option to
perform or to breach and pay”). Through Coase, the bad man theory of law has spread to the
four-corners of the law in large part through the law and economics movement. See, e.g., The
Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932–1970, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 163, 226 (1983) (“[Coase’s] social cost article, as everybody knows—it’s silly to
dwell on it—is basic to the whole economic analysis of law.” (statement of Richard Posner)).
46. Holmes, supra note 3, at 460–61.
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The Path of the Law to its modern development and use by judges and law
and economics scholars alike. Section A also considers some of the main
objections asserted against this theory by its critics, paying particular
attention to the manner in which Holmes’s theory is understood today.
Section B follows the same procedure set forth in section A with respect to
tort law, and section C focuses on the most recent application of Holmes’s
theory, in the realm of punitive damages, where the Supreme Court of the
United States has embraced (a corrupted version of) Holmes’s bad man
theory of law. It is important to note that this part of the Article is primarily
focused on how Holmes’s bad man theory of law has been understood and
developed by scholars and applied by judges. I reserve for Part III a deeper
exploration of Holmes’s own thoughts on the issue, which have not only
been inadequately developed, but which provide a much deeper and more
insightful theory of law capable of helping us better understand how our
law actually operates and how our law ought to be better structured in the
future.
A. The Bad Man’s Theory of Contracts: From Pacta Sunt Servanda and
the Sanctity of Contracts to Efficient Breach
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else . . . . But such
a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it
advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.

—Oliver Wendell Holmes 47
Although Holmes’s bad man theory of law has come to permeate AngloAmerican legal thought, 48 perhaps nowhere has the bad man had more
influence than in the realm of contracts, where scholars and judges alike
have spilled so much ink fleshing out and giving shape to Holmes’s vision
that it is difficult to think or write about contract law without the bad man
standing over one’s shoulders, monitoring one’s action, and attempting to
influence one’s thought.49 But how, exactly, does Holmes’s bad man
47. Id. at 462. Holmes was remarkably consistent in his thinking, and had begun to
develop this view some sixteen years previously in his groundbreaking work, The Common
Law. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., 1963) (1881) (“It is true that in some instances equity does what is called compelling
specific performance. But . . . [t]his remedy is an exceptional one. The only universal
consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if
the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference
until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he
chooses.”); see also id. at 247–48 (“If we look at the law as it would be regarded by one who
had no scruples against doing anything which he could do without incurring legal
consequences, it is obvious that the main consequence attached by the law to a contract is a
greater or less possibility of having to pay money. The only question from the purely legal
point of view is whether the promisor will be compelled to pay.”).
48. See supra Part I.
49. See Norcia v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1048
(D. Ariz. 2000) (noting that the “‘bad man’ theory of contracts permeates American common
law”).
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approach contract law, and what, if anything, can his views tell us about the
way Holmes thinks we are to understand contract law?
Perhaps the best way of understanding the bad man’s view of contract
law is to contrast it with the way his counterpart, the good man, understands
the subject. Unlike the bad man, the good man performs his promise not
because of the benefits he might receive, nor because of the costs he might
incur, but because, quite simply, performing one’s promise is the right thing
to do. 50 And because the good man is guided by the moral law emanating
from within, rather than the positive law imposed from without, he believes
that moral principles governing the institution of promise-keeping (e.g., the
idea that “there is something inherently despicable” about not keeping one’s
promises) should guide, or at the very least inform, the legal principles
governing contract law (e.g., “a properly organized society should not
tolerate this”). 51
The bad man, in contrast, sees matters quite differently. Holmes, in his
monumental speech,52 famously dismissed this type of moralistic thinking
as unhelpful and confusing, and invited his audience to understand contract
law as the bad man himself would understand it. In language now
immortalized in the contract law canon, Holmes wrote:
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest
than in the law of contract. Among other things, here again the so called
primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance beyond
what can be assigned and explained. The duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it,—and nothing else. . . . But such a mode of looking at the matter
stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much
ethics into the law as they can. 53

All of the bad men in attendance must have nodded with wild enthusiasm
at Holmes’s words. Holmes is undoubtedly right that the bad man, if he is
true to his name, would not understand the notion of “duty” in the same
moral sense that a good man would understand such a concept and would
probably look at the matter in much the same way as Holmes suggests. But
the last sentence of Holmes’s quoted speech is more problematic, for it
50. Professor Charles Fried refers to this as the “promise principle,” which constitutes
“the moral basis of contract law” by imposing on individuals “obligations where none
existed before.” CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 1, 8 (1981) (“By promising we transform a choice that was morally neutral into
one that is morally compelled.”). This same idea was discussed by Professor Morris R.
Cohen in his seminal piece, The Basis of Contract, and dubbed the “sanctity of promises”
approach. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 571–75
(1933).
51. Cohen, supra note 50, at 571; see also FRIED, supra note 50, at 16 (“An individual is
morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention
whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised
performance.”); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—Efficiency, Equity,
and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 111 (1981) (“[I]t should be wrong to
break a contract.”).
52. See Holmes, supra note 3.
53. Id. at 462; see supra note 47.
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appears to cast its net beyond the bad man himself, and seems to suggest
that all of us, and especially those among us who view contract law from
the good man’s perspective, are wrong about our views. But in what way
might we be wrong? Is Holmes’s argument that the good man does not
behave according to moral precepts? This seems unlikely. Or, was Holmes
arguing that the good man may understand law in this manner, but that
others do not? This might be closer to the truth, but still says nothing about
how contract law ought to be understood by everyone else. Or, was
Holmes’s point that others may also understand contract law as the good
man does, but that courts do not? This would seem to be relevant as a
descriptive matter, but would be inadequate to those who would seek to
reform contract law for the better. Perhaps this was Holmes’s point—that
contract law was better off without these moral infusions.
What Holmes meant by these words, and whether he was speaking
normatively or descriptively, is a matter of much debate,54 which I take up
in greater detail in Part III. What is not in debate, however, is the enormous
influence these words, as interpreted by generations of contracts scholars
and judges, have had on the subsequent history of contract law, 55 and it is
54. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach
and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2000) (arguing that others have
misunderstood Holmes’s bad man theory of contract law by linking it to the “towering legal
authority of Holmes,” whereas, in fact, Holmes “is incorrectly cast as articulating the idea of
a right to breach a contract”); see also Willard T. Barbour, The “Right” to Break a Contract,
16 MICH. L. REV. 106, 109 (1917) (“[N]either the history of the common law nor logic
sustains the proposition that there is no legal obligation to perform a contract or, conversely,
that there is a right to break a contract.”); Richard Hyland, Life, Death, and Contract, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 204, 207 (1995) (“[S]o much nonsense has been written about [Holmes’s]
thought, including the especially idiotic notion that Holmes adhered to a ‘bad man’s’ view of
the law, according to which our only obligations derive from a calculated prediction of
whether, in a particular situation, a court would impose a sanction. Posner, citing Holmes,
developed this idea with stubborn narrow-mindedness into the theory of efficient breach.”).
55. See, e.g., Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the
Doctrine of Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the Notion of the Contract Breacher as
Wrongdoer, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 647 (1999) (“The law has come to regard the obligation
to perform a contract as being generally equivalent to an option to perform or pay damages.
Holmes saw the matter this way more than one hundred years ago.”).
Some examples of judges invoking Holmes’s bad man view of contract law include
United States v. Bruchhausen, 977 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1992) (Fernandez, J., concurring)
(acknowledging that although “Holmes’s ‘bad man’ theory of the law . . . [is] realistic in
some sense,” it should not apply to support the idea of efficient theft in property law (citing
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459–62)); Norcia v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1047–48 (D. Ariz. 2000) (acknowledging that the “‘bad man’
theory of contracts permeates American common law. That is, a contracting party usually
cannot demand performance of a valid contract; rather, the defaulting party must either
perform or pay damages equivalent to the value of the promised performance. Under this
approach to contract theory, it follows that when performance becomes uneconomic, a
contracting party will not infrequently break a contract, preferring instead to pay damages,”
and finding that when a bad man breaches a contract, the only punishment is to pay damages,
and nothing else (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 462)); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony
Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. Mass. 1985) (recognizing that “[t]he suggested
freedom to break a contract and suffer liability only for the legally recognized damages is
within the scope of the idea often referred to as Holmes’ bad man theory of contract law—
that one who is willing to pay the penalty of such damages as the law assesses is free to
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this effect I am most concerned with here. According to the standard
interpretation, Holmes meant to suggest that a promisor, upon entering into
a contract, is not obligated to uphold his promissory commitment, 56 but
rather has a choice between performing, on the one hand, and breaching
while paying money damages, on the other. 57 The truth is that the bad man,
break the contract and pay” (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 461–62)), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988); Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 802
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (recognizing the conflict between “the rule that equity regards as done that
which ought to be done” and “the ‘bad man’ theory of Justice Holmes that would regard the
obligation of a contract as merely the liability to pay damages for its breach, which might
well be less than the profitability of non-performance” (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173–75 (1920))), vacated, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973); Estate of
Murrell v. Quin, 454 So. 2d 437, 440 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (examining the contrasting purposes of equity and contract law and noting
that “[f]uzzy moral notions of right and wrong, good and bad are irrelevant. That persons
not parties to the contract may suffer loss is of no concern of the law. . . . Persons potentially
affected who have failed to act to protect their interests sit idle at their peril. The law is
wholly indifferent to non-legal consequences. It would allow one to think and behave as the
proverbial Holmesean bad man to his heart’s content” (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 459));
Havana Central NY2 LLC v. Lunney’s Pub, Inc., 852 N.Y.S.2d 32, 37 & n.1 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007) (McGuire, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (lamenting the fact that, “[a]fter a
perhaps too brief struggle, I have succumbed to the temptation to invoke Holmes’ ‘bad man’
theory of law” in finding that a contract provision relieving a landlord of liability for failure
to give possession on commencement date is equivalent to term stating landlord is not
required to give possession of the premises if unable to do so (citing Holmes, supra note 3,
at 462)).
56. Alternatively, many scholars understand Holmes to be stating that a promisor may or
may not be morally obligated to perform his promise, but dismiss such considerations as
legally irrelevant. This, for instance, was the view of Judge Isaac Parker, who famously
wrote well before Holmes that although some “disgraceful” promisors (“men of a different
character,” he calls them) may refuse to perform promises “they are bound in foro
conscientioe to perform,” the law will nevertheless not get involved, but leave the
enforcement of such promises to that “interior forum, as the tribunal of conscience has been
aptly called.” Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 209–10 (1825). The court went on to
note:
What a man ought to do, generally he ought to be made to do, whether he promise
or refuse. . . . Without doubt there are great interests of society which justify
withholding the coercive arm of the law from these duties of imperfect obligation,
as they are called; imperfect, not because they are less binding upon the
conscience than those which are called perfect, but because the wisdom of the
social law does not impose sanctions upon them.
Id. at 210–11; see also Estate of Murrell, 454 So. 2d at 440 (Robertson, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
57. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and
the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558 (1977) (“The modern law of contract damages
is based on the premise that a contractual obligation is not necessarily an obligation to
perform, but rather an obligation to choose between performance and compensatory
damages.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118 (4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW] (arguing that a “voluntary but . . .
efficient” breach “give[s] point to Holmes’s dictum that it is not the policy of the law to
compel adherence to contracts but only to require each party to choose between performing
in accordance with the contract and compensating the other party for any injury resulting
from a failure to perform”); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 58
(2003) (“Holmes pointed out that in a regime in which the sanction for breach of contract is
merely an award of compensatory damages to the victim, the entire practical effect of
signing a contract is that by doing so one obtains an option to break it.”); Clayton P. Gillette,
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of course, does see matters this way, and will probably, as a descriptive
matter, choose his course of conduct based not on moral considerations, but
by performing a cost-benefit analysis. 58
Although some scholars lament the fact that morality does not play a
larger role in Holmes’s theory, 59 most scholars (even if only reluctantly)
concede that modern contract law is essentially Holmesian 60 and ultimately
does “exclude[] considerations of morality”61 in order to “advance the
objective of economic efficiency.” 62 Today, the most ardent supporters of
Holmes’s theory are those working within the law and economics
paradigm, 63 who have applied Holmes’s bad man view of contracts with
particular force to the modern theory of efficient breach, 64 which acts as the
Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 658–59 (“Professor
Posner suggests that the modern theory of contract damages . . . views a contract as an
undertaking to perform or pay damages for nonperformance . . . .”); Remington, supra note
55, at 647; Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against
Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1429 n.1 (2004) (“It is well
known that contract damages effectively give the promisor an option between performing the
promise or breaching and paying damages.”).
58. See, e.g., Norcia, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
59. See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 51, at 138 n.189 (noting that Holmes’s rebellion against
the will theory of contract law may explain his “deprecation of ethics in the law,” but “does
not justify it”).
60. See, e.g., Remington, supra note 55, at 647.
61. Linzer, supra note 51, at 111; see, e.g., Estate of Murrell, 454 So. 2d at 440
(Robertson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Fuzzy moral notions of right and
wrong, good and bad are irrelevant. . . . The law is wholly indifferent to non-legal
consequences. It would allow one to think and behave as the proverbial Holmesean bad man
to his heart’s content.”).
62. Linzer, supra note 51, at 111 (arguing that although “it should be wrong to break a
contract,” contract law “has emphasized an approach that excludes considerations of
morality and is said to advance the objective of economic efficiency”); see also Patton v.
Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (“Even if the breach is
deliberate, it is not necessarily blameworthy. The promisor may simply have discovered that
his performance is worth more to someone else. If so, efficiency is promoted by allowing
him to break his promise, provided he makes good the promisee’s actual losses.”). But see
Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1659 (2006)
(commenting that “much of society and many religious and philosophical traditions would
disagree with Judge Posner’s view, arguing that breaking a promise simply because one has
later realized it is to one’s personal advantage to do so is morally blameworthy in most
instances”).
63. Here, again, Holmes’s views have proved to be remarkably prescient. In the same
speech in which he created the bad man, Holmes acknowledged that although “the blackletter man may be the man of the present” with respect to the “rational study of law,” “the
man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.” Holmes, supra note
3, at 469.
64. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 633 (2008)
(arguing that Holmes’s statement “has since been developed into the ‘efficient breach’
theory of contractual remedies, which is based on the argument that in situations where a
promisor’s profits from a potential breach are in excess of the promisee’s loss from such
breach, the breach should be encouraged (or at the very least, not deterred)—with no
restraints whatsoever imposed by morality”); see also Campbell, supra note 27, at 461–62
(“[T]he idea of an efficient breach which allows the defendant to maximise his utilities is
traceable to Holmes’ famous observation that: ‘[T]he only universal consequence of a
legally binding promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised
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bad man’s shibboleth 65 in distinguishing those who would invoke
morality 66 when determining one’s contractual obligations from those who
would not. 67
For instance, the strongest proponents of efficient breach theory not only
acknowledge, as a descriptive point, the promisor’s right to breach a
contract where doing so is efficient, 68 but even go so far as to claim that the
law should encourage, as a normative matter, such breaches.69 Putting
aside for the moment Holmes’s own views on the matter, it is in large part
due to such statements that many scholars have opposed this theory as

event does not come to pass. [The law of contract] leaves [the promisor] free to break his
contract if he chooses.’ This observation smacks of the cynicism of Holmes’s ‘bad
man’ . . . .” (quoting HOLMES, supra note 47, at 236) (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 459));
Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (1989) (“The
modern theory of ‘efficient breach’ is a variation and systematic extension of Holmes’s
outlook on contractual remedy.”); Grey, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 27, at 832
(“[Holmes’s] formulations represented a breakthrough, the implications of which would not
be fully absorbed for several generations. At the outset of his career as a legal theorist, he
planted the germ of the whole modern analysis of tort and contract in terms of risk
allocation, later embodied in such notions as loss spreading, cost internalization, and
efficient breach.”); Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV.
2187, 2202 (2004) (“[T]he modern-day economic elaboration of Holmes’s theory [is] the socalled theory of efficient breach.”); Perillo, supra note 54, at 1090 (“[I]t has become
commonplace to tie the economists’ notion of efficient breach to the towering legal authority
of Holmes . . . .”).
65. The term itself seems to have been first coined in 1977 by Professors Charles J.
Goetz and Robert E. Scott. See Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal
Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 381, 384 n.11 (2005) (“It appears that the term ‘efficient breach’ may have been
coined, at least in print, by Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott.” (citing Goetz & Scott,
supra note 57)).
66. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 50, at 16 (“An individual is morally bound to keep his
promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give
grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised performance.”).
67. See, e.g., Craig S. Warkol, Note, Resolving The Paradox Between Legal Theory and
Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
321, 345 (1998) (“The theory of efficient breach encourages the parties to the contract and
the reviewing judge to look at the contract without moral considerations.”).
68. Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.). But see
Williams, supra note 62, at 1659.
69. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 57, at 119 (“[I]n some
cases a party [to a contract] is tempted to break his contract simply because his profit from
breach would exceed his [expected] profit from completion of the contract. If [his profit
from breach] would also exceed the expected profit to the other party from completion of the
contract, and if damages are limited to the loss of [expected] profit, there will be an incentive
to commit a breach. But there should be.”); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract,
Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970)
(“Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from
his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had
performance been rendered.”); Remington, supra note 55 (arguing that the law encourages
efficient breaches, except where those breaches are or should be wrongful). But see
Friedmann, supra note 64, at 18 (arguing that the law of contract has evolved away from
recognizing efficient breach); Perillo, supra note 54, at 1093–98.
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morally wanting 70 and, worse yet, damaging to the institution of promisekeeping. 71
The previous analysis seems to suggest that one can either accept
Holmes’s bad man view of contract law and hold that morality is and ought
to be irrelevant to a proper understanding of this subject, or can find, along
with the good man, that one cannot properly understand contract law
without acknowledging its moral underpinnings. What seems clear,
however, is that one cannot simultaneously hold the views of both the good
man and the bad man. Either morality is relevant to contract law, or it is
not. If it is relevant, it would seem that the good man’s approach is better,
and Holmes’s bad man may have little to offer to the institution of contract
law, except perhaps the need for better enforcement. If the bad man is
right, however, it raises a number of questions regarding what, if anything,
we the people should do about it. If, contrary to what was stated earlier,
70. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:
Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake”, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 942 (1985)
(describing a society “in which people can confidently rely on each other” as “morally
superior to the state of constrained avarice depicted by ‘bad man’ theories of legal
obligation”); Friedmann, supra note 64, at 3–4 (noting that even Posner by 1986 had begun
to distinguish and decry “opportunistic breach” from efficient breach, and pointing out that
“[i]t is not explained why opportunistic breaches should be discouraged even if they are
efficient. Is it because they are morally reprehensible?” (citing RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 et seq., 105–06 (3d ed. 1986))); Linzer, supra note 51; Ian
R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 963–65
(1982) (likening efficient breach of contract to efficient theft of property, and rejecting both
on moral grounds). I should note that the theory of efficient breach has also been attacked
on non-moral grounds. For an examination of some of these grounds, see generally Marco J.
Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to Contract Law Remedies, 56
UCLA L. REV. 59 (2008).
71. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 42, at 687 (“The prediction model, if widely accepted,
would breed disrespect for law by encouraging the public to act like Holmes’ bad man,
understanding the law as imposing an obligation not to get caught, rather than an obligation
to conform to a norm. To be sure, contract law includes a doctrine of efficient breach, under
which a contract to do X is understood as imposing an obligation to do X or pay the resulting
damages from not doing X.”); Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal
History of a Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1201 (2009)
(“[T]he growth of economism as an academic mode of thinking about law devalues any
conception of law as expressing norms or public purposes. Lawyers influenced by the
‘efficient breach’ theories of legal economics theorize Holmes’s hypothetical ‘bad man’ as
Everyman . . . [which allows parties to violate the law] ‘when violations are profitable.’”
(quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982); Holmes, supra note 3, at 459)). There is
even some concern that this bad man view of contracts, through the doctrine of efficient
breach, may be spreading to the realm of public law. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams,
Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1327–28
(1998) (“The efficient breach concept of statutory and regulatory law, which is based on an
understanding of law as a series of prices established for the ‘right’ to violate the law, has
evolved as a direct extension of the efficient breach of contract theory. . . . [Although]
‘Holmes’ “bad man” understanding of contract law has become so descriptively accurate that
few would contest the notion of a “right” to breach a contract,’ this insight about private law,
even if it were true, says nothing about whether one also has a ‘right’ to breach public,
statutory law simply by assuming a similar Holmesian equivalence between performance
and paying damages.” (quoting Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An
Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1559 (1995))).
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both views are correct, then it seems that a reworking or reinterpretation of
Holmes’s views are in order. 72 For the time being, however, let us turn our
attention to the bad man’s view of tort law to see how scholars and courts
have developed Holmes’s theory in this area of our law.
B. The Bad Man’s Theory of Torts: From the Duty of a Reasonable Person
to the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Homo Economicus
The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and
negligence, and so forth, and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more
common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral sense,
at some stage of the argument, and so to drop into fallacy. . . . I think that
commonly malice, intent, and negligence mean only that the danger was
manifest to a greater or less degree, under the circumstances known to the
actor . . . .

— Oliver Wendell Holmes 73
Just as Holmes’s bad man paved the way towards a new understanding of
contract law, he likewise paved the way in tort law, where Holmes’s
invocation of the bad man, along with his focus on external sanctions rather
than internal motivations, and his insistence on separating the legal and
moral spheres, revolutionized this area of law.74 In the same speech in
which Holmes sought to dispel the “mystic significance” attached to the
morality-based “primary rights and duties” of contract law, 75 Holmes urged

72. This is the approach I take in Part III of this Article.
73. Holmes, supra note 3, at 460, 471. Holmes articulated a similar view in another
monumental work nearly two decades earlier. See HOLMES, supra note 47, at 115 (“Be the
exceptions more or less numerous, the general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man
indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, reputation, or estate, at the hands of his
neighbors, not because they are wrong, but because they are harms.”). Interpreting the first
passage, one commentator wrote, “Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the theory that as law
matures, liability—civil and criminal—becomes more external and less reliant on mental
state.” Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
2071, 2077 (1994).
74. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal
Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1571 (2006)
(“Holmes, by linking a radical jurisprudential argument to a radical reconceptualization of
tort law, changed the landscape of tort theory.”); see also DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN
HOLMES: HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 1 (1995) (“From the beginning, th[e] debate
[governing the legitimacy of tort law] has been shaped by the ideas of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, the most illustrious jurist in American law.”); Grey, Legal Pragmatism, supra note
27, at 832 (“[Holmes’s] formulations represented a breakthrough, the implications of which
would not be fully absorbed for several generations. At the outset of his career as a legal
theorist, he planted the germ of the whole modern analysis of tort and contract in terms of
risk allocation, later embodied in such notions as loss spreading, cost internalization, and
efficient breach.”); Sheldon M. Novick, Holmes’s Path, Holmes’s Goal, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1028, 1030 (1997) (“The starting point of this transformation is the central insight of The
Common Law, an imaginative leap that changed all legal thinking afterward: the organizing
principle of the common law was liability, not duty.”).
75. Holmes, supra note 3, at 462 (“Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral
ideas more manifest than in the law of contract. Among other things, here again the so
called primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance beyond what can be

2011]

FINDING THE GOOD IN HOLMES’S BAD MAN

2089

us to do the same for tort law by understanding the so-called “duties”
imposed on us from the perspective of the bad man. According to this
view, we ought to abandon the internal perspective that would require us to
consult our “vaguer sanctions of conscience” in order to understand the
“duties” we owe to one another, in both tort law and contract law, in purely
external terms: in both torts and contracts, the only “duty” imposed on us
by the law is to “pay a compensatory sum” if we breach our duties toward
our fellow citizens. 76
Although, once again, Holmes’s bad man view of tort law was probably
misunderstood, 77 the influence of these views (even as misunderstood)
cannot be overemphasized. 78 Holmes was not merely tinkering at the
margins with the writ of trespass, or attempting to reform the law of
negligence by reconceptualizing the way we view causation; rather, he was
promulgating “the blueprint for [tort law’s] organization and
development” 79 by erecting an entire jurisprudential edifice from the
assigned and explained. The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”).
76. Id. at 459, 462 (analogizing contract- and tort-based “duties” by describing the
“duty” imposed on a person who “commit[s] a contract” as one in which they are “liable to
pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass,” and the “duty” imposed
on a person who “commit[s] a tort,” as one in which they are also “liable to pay a
compensatory sum”). Elsewhere in his speech, Holmes listed “as other examples of the use
by the law of words drawn from morals” the terms “malice, intent, and negligence,” and
sought “to show that [these terms] mean[] something different in law from what [they]
mean[] in morals, and also to show how the difference has been obscured by giving to
principles which have little or nothing to do with each other the same name.” Id. at 463.
It is remarkable to note how consistent Holmes’s views were over time. In The Common
Law, an equally famous work written nearly two decades before Path of the Law, Holmes
offered the following view of torts:
The law of torts abounds in moral phraseology. It has much to say of wrongs,
of malice, fraud, intent, and negligence. Hence it may naturally be supposed that
the risk of a man’s conduct is thrown upon him as the result of some moral shortcoming. But while this notion has been entertained, the extreme opposite will be
found to have been a far more popular opinion;—I mean the notion that a man is
answerable for all the consequences of his acts, or, in other words, that he acts at
his peril always, and wholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the
matter.
HOLMES, supra note 47, at 65.
77. See, e.g., ALSCHULER, supra note 26, at 1 (“[P]ost-Holmes visions of law are the
product of a revolt against objective concepts of right and wrong rather than a revolt against
formalism . . . .”). Holmes’s actual views are discussed in Part III, infra.
78. See, e.g., CALNAN, supra note 33, at 5 (describing Holmes’s “influence on tort law”
as “both enormous and undeniable”).
79. See, e.g., id. Professor Calnan goes on to say about Holmes’s monumental work:
The impact of The Common Law was profound and immediate. In an 1881
review, noted English legal historian Frederick Pollock remarked that “Mr.
Holmes’ book will be a most valuable—we should say almost an indispensable—
companion to the scientific study of legal history.” Frederic Maitland, another
giant of English legal history, gushed that The Common Law [“]for a long time to
come will leave its mark wide and deep on all the best thoughts of Americans and
Englishmen about the history of their common law.”
Id. (quoting Frederic Maitland, The Materials for English Legal History, in 2 COLLECTED
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 8 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911); G. EDWARD WHITE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 189 (1993)).
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ground up where “there simply was no law of torts.” 80 And the blueprint
Holmes used to build this monumental intellectual cathedral could best be
appreciated, according to Holmes, by looking at it through the eyes of the
bad man. 81
But what is at stake, exactly, in adopting the bad man’s perspective with
regard to tort law? Once again, it may be helpful to contrast the bad man
perspective with its counterpart, the “good man.” According to this
perspective, a good man understands the notion of obligation not in terms of
an external penalty a court may impose whenever he engages in a
dangerous activity or fails to take the proper level of care, but in terms of
internal norms governing the rights and duties that members of civil society
owe each other. 82 Accordingly, courts adopting such a view do not impose
liability on an actor simply because the danger of his activities are
“manifest to a greater or less degree,”83 but because the actor has acted
wrongly in that he has violated the rights of another. Viewed in such a way,
the morally laden language of tort law is not something to be ignored or
explained away, but can be pointed to as evidence supporting the idea that
what the law really requires is for one party to conform his behavior to
commonly accepted notions of morality, and not to simply choose between
performing one’s duty or paying a sanction.
Conforming one’s behavior to the internal standards of morality has other
benefits as well. If, following Aristotle, we hold that “[m]oral goodness . . .
is the result of habit,” 84 and that “it is from the repeated performance of just
and temperate acts that we acquire virtues,”85 then a good man view of law
that requires individuals to internalize the law’s norms would, with
continual practice, help individuals become more virtuous citizens
themselves. 86 Allowing citizens to behave as Holmes’s bad man, on the
other hand, would not only fail to carry out the Aristotelian idea, but would

80. See, e.g., id. at 4; see also 1 EDWIN A. JAGGARD, HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,
at vi (1895) (“The theory of Torts was essentially terra incognita until the contributions of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., appeared on the subject.”).
81. CALNAN, supra note 33, at 8 (“Holmes believed that law is not a principle of justice,
but merely ‘[t]he prophe[cies] of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious.’ In other words, the law is a material sanction that will motivate a ‘bad man’ to
refrain from bad acts, not an ethical rule which depends for its enforcement on ‘vaguer
sanctions of conscience.’” (quoting Holmes, supra note 3, at 460–61)).
82. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2003); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE
LAW (1995).
83. Holmes, supra note 3, at 471.
84. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II, at 31 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin
Books 2004) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
85. Id. at 37–38.
86. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, bk. III, ch. ix, at 82 (“[W]hosoever endeavours
to establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual
who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the first care of him who would found a city
. . . must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an alliance for selfdefence; differing from those of the same cast which are made between different people only
in place: for law is an agreement and a pledge . . . between the citizens of their intending to
do justice to each other.”).
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make a mockery of the law itself by allowing individuals to inflict harm on
others whenever they could pay the legal cost of doing so.
Holmes, however, seemed to explicitly reject this internal point of view.
In a famous series of lectures given nearly two decades before The Path of
the Law, Holmes acknowledged the morally laden language of tort law but
seemed to reject the notion that it was there “for the purpose of improving
men’s hearts.” 87 Rather:
The true explanation of the reference of liability to a moral standard . . . is
to give a man a fair chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held
responsible for it. It is intended to reconcile the policy of letting accidents
lie where they fall, and the reasonable freedom of others with the
protection of the individual from injury. 88

Holmes’s bad man perspective has had a tremendous impact on tort law
in this country 89 and has radically changed the way we view even the most
basic of torts. Consider, for example, the tort of negligence with its reliance
on the “reasonable man” standard as that standard was understood before
Holmes.
When is conduct negligent? According to the famous test set forth by
Baron Edward Hall Alderson 90 in the 1856 case of Blyth v. Birmingham
Waterworks Co., 91 which not only established the “reasonable man”
87. HOLMES, supra note 47, at 115.
88. Id. Holmes recognized that his theory cut against the grain. In The Path of the Law,
Holmes reports a recent conversation he had with a famous English judge to whom he had
conveyed his views: “[W]hen I stated my view to a very eminent English judge the other
day, he said: ‘You are discussing what the law ought to be; as the law is, you must show a
right. A man is not liable for negligence unless he is subject to a duty.’” Holmes, supra note
3, at 471–72. Although Holmes thought that the English judge’s view was decidedly
“wrong,” he acknowledged that “it is familiar, and I dare say generally is accepted in
England.” Id. at 472.
89. ROSENBERG, supra note 74, at 1 (“From the beginning, th[e] debate [governing the
legitimacy of tort law] has been shaped by the ideas of Oliver Wendell Holmes, the most
illustrious jurist in American law.”); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 74, at 1571 (“Holmes,
by linking a radical jurisprudential argument to a radical reconceptualization of tort law,
changed the landscape of tort theory.”); Grey, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 27, at 832
(“[Holmes’s] formulations represented a breakthrough, the implications of which would not
be fully absorbed for several generations. At the outset of his career as a legal theorist, he
planted the germ of the whole modern analysis of tort and contract in terms of risk
allocation, later embodied in such notions as loss spreading, cost internalization, and
efficient breach.”); Novick, supra note 74, at 1030 (“The starting point of this transformation
is the central insight of The Common Law, an imaginative leap that changed all legal
thinking afterward: the organizing principle of the common law was liability, not duty.”).
90. Baron Alderson has another claim to fame as well: he was the judge who
established the basic rule, familiar to every Contracts student in the Anglo-American legal
world, that consequential damages, to be recoverable, must be foreseeable by the promisor at
the time of entering into a contract. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.)
151; 9 Ex. 341, 354 (“Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of
contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally,
i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”).
91. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex.); 11 Ex. 781.
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standard, 92 but serves as the basis for pattern jury instructions to this day.93
negligence is defined as “the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do.” 94 Such a standard, it seems, would not
be very hospitable to Holmes’s bad man, who could no longer rely on an
external cost-benefit analysis to guide his behavior, but must presumably
adopt the internal perspective of other “reasonable men” of his community,
who will no doubt be guided by their own “vaguer sanctions of
conscience,” 95 if he is to avoid acting negligently.
The bad man’s prospects take on a decidedly different flavor, however,
and fare much better in the hands of law and economics scholars, who have
done for Holmes’s theory of tort law (through the Learned Hand Formula)
what other scholars have done for his theory of contract law (through
efficient breach theory). In fact, perhaps nowhere is Holmes’s bad man
theory of law more perfectly encapsulated than in the famous Learned Hand
Formula, 96 which remains the starting point for the economic analysis of
negligence to this day. 97 First formally articulated in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 98 Judge Learned Hand also rejected the “reasonable

92. Margo Schlanger, Gender Matters: Teaching a Reasonable Woman Standard in
Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769, 769 n.2 (2001).
93. See Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J.
JURIS. 143, 144 n.2 (2002).
94. Blyth, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1049.
95. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
96. See Patrick J. Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort
Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 742–48 (2001) (arguing that the Hand Formula was
influenced by the definition of negligence adopted by the Restatement (First) of Torts, which
can itself be traced to the seminal article by Henry Taylor Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L.
REV. 40 (1915), who was in turn influenced by the theory of negligence articulated by Oliver
Wendell Holmes in his famous book, The Common Law). Incidentally, Holmes himself was
likely influenced by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Id. at 748.
97. COLEMAN, supra note 82, at 14 (“[E]conomic analysis explicates negligence in terms
of the Learned Hand formula . . . . Negligence is the imposition of unreasonable risks, and
the criteria for the proper application of the concept of a reasonable risk are given by the
Learned Hand test. The Learned Hand test is itself simply an expression of the economic
goal of tort law, namely, the optimal reduction of accident costs.”); Samuel J. Levine,
Richard Posner Meets Reb Chaim of Brisk: A Comparative Study in the Founding of
Intellectual Legal Movements, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 95, 108 (2006) (stating that the Hand
Formula served as the “basis for the economic analysis of negligence” since the case was
first decided in 1947); Daniel Q. Posin, The Error of the Coase Theorem: Of Judges Hand
and Posner and Carroll Towing, 74 TUL. L. REV. 629, 644 & n.48 (1999) (“In effect, the
Posner-Hand analysis uses the Coase Theorem” which is “‘basic to the whole economic
analysis of law’” (quoting The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at
Chicago, 1932–1970, supra note 45, at 226 (statement of Richard Posner))); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2007) (“Professor Posner
used the case to energize his entire economic theory of tort law, which, in my view, remains
the most celebrated within the legal academy.”).
98. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9, 85–86 (1987) (stating that although
“most lawyers and law professors still believe . . . that the actual as well as the ideal function
of tort law is to achieve fairness rather than efficiency,” in fact “something like the Hand
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man” standard that seemed to require a potential wrongdoer to view the law
of negligence from the good man’s internal point of view, 99 and provided
the following external standard by which courts should determine whether
or not a defendant had acted negligently:
[An] owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability [of
harm]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury [if the harm comes about];
[and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring
this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL. 100

formula has long been used to decide negligence cases,” and “Hand was purporting only to
make explicit what had long been the implicit meaning of negligence”).
99. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 96, at 749–50 (stating that just as “[t]he critical question
for Holmes . . . was not simple foreseeability by the ordinary reasonable man, but the
specific laws of antecedence and consequence that enable us to foresee harm from certain
conduct under certain circumstances,” so too for Judge Hand, who, as a “friend and admirer
of Holmes,” “refus[ed] to include foreseeability in his simplified reformulation of the
unreasonable foreseeable risk test”). The result was a test that was “more scientific: you do
not need to use that weaselly creature, the ordinary reasonable man, with his penchant for
sentiment and outmoded custom, who may upset the purely objective calculation of costs
and benefits.” Id. But see Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 817
(2001) (noting that, although the reasonable person test and the Hand Formula can be
thought of “as independent and alternative techniques for determining negligence,” the two
can also be combined “by characterizing the Hand Formula as the test a reasonable person
would use in deciding which precautions to take to avoid accident risks to others”).
100. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173 (Hand, J.). As pointed out by Professor Kelley,
“Judge Hand had expressed this same understanding of the appropriate test of negligence,
without the algebraic notation, over six years before in Conway v. O’Brien.” Kelley, supra
note 96, at 743 (citing Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.)
(“The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors:
the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it
happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.”)); see
id. at 754 (“Judge Posner recognized the Carroll Towing Co. negligence formula as ‘a
valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are relevant to a judgment of negligence
and about the relationship among those factors’ even though ‘the formula does not yield
mathematically precise results in practice, [since the burden of precautions, the probability
and potential gravity of harm have never all been quantified] in an actual lawsuit.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba,
683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.))); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–33 (1972) (“Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic
meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it occurs by the
probability of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be anticipated from
incurring the costs necessary to prevent the accident. The cost of prevention is what Hand
meant by the burden of taking precautions against the accident . . . . If the cost of safety
measures or of curtailment—whichever cost is lower—exceeds the benefit in accident
avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic terms,
to forgo accident prevention. A rule making the enterprise liable for the accidents that occur
in such cases cannot be justified on the ground that it will induce the enterprise to increase
the safety of its operations. When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a
rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident victims rather
than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability.”).
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Under this approach, codified in our law101 and reflected in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, 102 a court need “merely calculate[] the costs
and the benefits of an activity to decide whether an injurer [is]
negligent,” 103 and need not be concerned with determining what a
virtuous 104 or reasonable 105 person in the defendant’s position would have
101. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV.
1013, 1037–38 (1991) (“[T]he process of balancing the magnitude of the risk against the cost
of risk prevention has been embedded in negligence law since the nineteenth century, and
was rendered official by the First Restatement of Torts and Learned Hand’s opinion in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.”). But see Gilles, supra note 99, at 861 (arguing that
although the Restatement (Third) has explicitly adopted the Hand Formula, the cost-benefit
of risk-utility balancing has been an implicit aspect of the reasonable person standard for
seventy years); Kelley, supra note 96, at 752–53 (“Stephen Gilles has confirmed what this
author had earlier suggested: judges ordinarily instruct juries on the negligence issue to
determine whether the actor behaved as a ‘reasonably prudent person’ or an ‘ordinary
reasonable person.’ Judges do not ordinarily instruct juries on the negligence issue to
balance the costs and benefits of greater care.” (citing Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand
Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1016 (1994))); Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171,
1183 (2008) (“To be sure, there is much controversy about the descriptive claim that the
Hand test reflects Anglo-American tort law. Jury instructions (except in some products
liability cases) rarely refer to Hand balancing, and appellate decisions refer to such balancing
only intermittently. Rather, ‘reasonable care under the circumstances’ appears to be the
(remarkably vague and opaque) ‘standard’ that many jurisdictions require juries to apply in
determining negligence.” (footnotes omitted)).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
(2005) (“A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all
the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct
lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”). It may have been the case, however, that Judge
Learned Hand was himself influenced by the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement
project, rather than the other way around. See Kelley, supra note 96, at 743–44 (“Where,
then, did Judge Hand get his formula? We know from his biographers that Learned Hand
was an intellectually ambitious and progressive judge, alive to the latest currents of thought
in the legal community. This found expression in many ways, including Judge Hand’s early
membership in the ALI and his vigorous support for its project of restating the common law.
This suggests that a likely source for Hand’s description of the negligence standard would be
the Restatement of the Division of the Law Relating to Negligence, approved by the ALI at
its annual meeting in 1934. Sure enough, when we turn to that Restatement we find
negligence explained as conduct posing an unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm to another.
The Restatement defined an unreasonable risk as ‘one of such magnitude as to outweigh
what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.’
The Restatement went on to list factors to be considered in determining the utility of the
actor’s conduct, as well as factors considered in determining the magnitude of the risk.”
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 291 (1934)) (citing GERALD GUNTHER,
LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 190–415 (1994))); see also Randy Lee, A Look at
God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 387 (1992) (“The Restatement
approach differs from the Hand test only in that it measures the burden and loss, factors in
terms of social burden and loss rather than in terms of the burden and loss to the parties.”
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291–93 (1977))).
103. Frank J. Vandall, Judge Posner’s Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35
EMORY L.J. 383, 383 (1986).
104. Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A
Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 592 (2002) (citing Heidi Li
Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000)).
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foreseen, or whether a tortfeasor’s actions were intrinsically right or
wrong. 106 Rather, under this modern-day iteration of the “bad man” theory
of negligence, a court need only determine which party is the “cheapest cost
avoider” 107 (i.e., “the actor who could most easily discover and
inexpensively remediate the hazard”),108 and then place the cost of accident
prevention on this person to encourage them to take only those precautions
that are economically feasible.109
If we recall Holmes’s definition of the bad man as one “who cares only
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict,” 110 one can immediately see how useful such a theory would be to
him. When followed, 111 such a theory allows the bad man to predict, with a
fair degree of accuracy, how a court would rule, and thereby provides him
with external guidance (via the threat of possible sanctions) regarding the
appropriate precautions to take.

105. Id. at 591 (citing HOLMES, supra note 47, at 87–88). But see RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 169 (6th ed. 2003) (characterizing Blyth v. Birmingham
Waterworks Co. as a case illustrating Baron Alderson’s economic understanding of the law
of negligence, and remarking that although the injury was “of unprecedented severity,” the
court did not find negligence because “[t]he damage was not so great as to make the
expected cost of the accident greater than the cost of prevention” because “the probability of
the loss had been low”).
106. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 104, at 591–92 (citing Catharine Wells, Tort Law as
Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348,
2402–13 (1990)).
107. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096–97, 1119 (1972).
108. M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals
Through the Lenses of Corrective Justice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1047 (1998).
109. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 99, at 818 (“The Hand Norm tells us that it is negligent
to omit a precaution if the reduction in expected accident costs would have been greater than
the costs of the precaution,” or, stated algebraically, “it is negligent to omit a precaution if
PL > B”); Kelley & Wendt, supra note 104, at 591 (“[A]dvocates of the Carroll Towing Co.
test have suggested that the ordinary reasonable person standard asks a cost-benefit question:
whether the burden of taking precautions against a foreseeable risk is less than the
foreseeable probability times the foreseeable gravity of threatened harm to others if the
precautions are not taken.”).
110. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459; see also id. at 457 (“The object of our study, then, is
prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of
the courts.”).
111. Compare LANDES & POSNER, supra note 98, at 9, 85–86 (stating that although “most
lawyers and law professors still believe . . . that the actual as well as the ideal function of tort
law is to achieve fairness rather than efficiency,” in fact “something like the Hand formula
has long been used to decide negligence cases,” and “Hand was purporting only to make
explicit what had long been the implicit meaning of negligence”), and Robert L. Rabin, Law
for Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2275 (1996) (“Long before Carroll Towing was
decided, common law judges were speaking the prose version of the Learned Hand formula
without knowing it . . . .”), with Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the
“Hand” Formula, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 145, 273 (2003) (“If one turns from the
academic discussions of negligence law to the actual cases, it immediately becomes clear
that the aggregate-risk-utility test of negligence that is set forth in Learned Hand’s formula,
in the various editions of the Restatement, and in Richard Posner’s academic writings is
almost never referred to in jury instructions, is seldom referred to in judicial opinions, and is
inconsistent with the actual criteria applied by the courts in various types of situations.”).

2096

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

And what sorts of precautions will a bad man likely take under such a
theory? Like our bad man of contract law, who will breach his contract
wherever it is profitable to do so, the bad man of tort law will also breach
his tort-based “duty” whenever it is profitable to do so.
Consider, for example, the following facts. The CEO of a large auto
manufacturer wishes to offer an affordable subcompact car, and is presented
with one of two choices by his design engineers. If the CEO selects choice
number one, then a fuel tank will be placed above the rear axle of the car,
which will increase the car’s safety by allowing additional crunch space in
the event of a rear-end collision (which customers will appreciate) while
reducing the available trunk space (which customers will not appreciate)
and decreasing overall sales (which the company will not appreciate). If, on
the other hand, the CEO selects choice number two, then the fuel tank will
be placed behind the rear axle of the car, thereby reducing the car’s safety
by reducing the available crunch space in the event of a rear-end collision
and causing the gas tank to explode (which will cause some individuals to
suffer agonizing burn deaths and burn injuries), but increase the trunk space
(which those who survive will appreciate) and increase overall sales (which
the company will appreciate). How should the company make its decision?
What advice would you, as the lawyer, give to a company in this position?
If the CEO (or his lawyer) behaves like the bad man, he will not choose
his course of conduct based on his internal “vaguer sanctions of
conscience,” but by recourse to an external cost-benefit analysis. If the total
revenue generated by pursuing option number two exceeds the total revenue
generated by option number one by a large enough margin to pay for the
increased cost of accidents generated by option number one, then option
number two will be pursued, but not otherwise. The human lives at risk are
only important to the extent that their loss in an accident must be paid for
by the company.
Let us add one further wrinkle to this hypothetical. The CEO has
decided to pursue option number two for the reasons just discussed, but
before the cars are manufactured, he is again approached by his design
engineers and told that about 180 individuals are expected to suffer
agonizing burn deaths from the exploding gas tanks, and another 180 are
expected to undergo serious burn injuries, but that all of these deaths and
injuries can be prevented by reinforcing the automobiles at a cost of a few
extra dollars per automobile. In this case, how is a CEO employing
Holmes’s bad man calculus expected to behave?
First, he will put before him Learned Hand’s formula, B < PL, and will
start plugging in numbers. Suppose he predicts 112 that each death will cost
the company $200,000, and each burn injury will cost the company
$67,000. He also knows that about 180 individuals are expected to suffer
each type of injury. Multiplying 180 by $267,000, he calculates that the
total cost to the company of the deaths and injuries that will be caused if the
112. Recall that the “bad man,” by definition, “cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict.” Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
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repairs are not undertaken will be roughly $50 million. He has now
calculated PL, but still needs a figure for B. To get this figure, the CEO
will not be too interested in the few extra dollars it might cost per car to
undertake the repairs, but will be very interested in knowing how much it
will cost to repair each car in the entire fleet. Suppose he is told that the
cost of such repairs is around $137 million. Plugging this number into B,
he now recognizes that B > PL, and the company can avoid being found
negligent if it invests $137 million to reduce $50 million of harm. But he
also recognizes something else. If he does not require the company to
undertake any repairs whatsoever, then B will be less than PL, and, per the
Learned Hand formula, a court will find the company negligent. This
seems bad at first, but upon further reflection, is not so bad after all. This is
because the CEO also predicts that the damages it will be required to pay by
a court in the event of being found negligent will only be PL, or $50
million, which would be lower than the cost of the repairs, or $137 million,
for an $87 million “savings.” Needless to say, the CEO adopting the bad
man approach will not elect to have the repairs made. 113
As you have probably guessed, the “hypothetical” above was more than
loosely based on the facts of a real case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Company. 114 The car was a Pinto, the company was Ford, and the public
was furious. 115 Acknowledging, in some vague sense, that cost-benefit
takes place in boardrooms across corporate America is one thing. Allowing
a company to gamble with human lives is another thing entirely. It was in
large part for this reason that the jury required Ford to pay an additional
$125 million in punitive damages, 116 and why Holmes’s views (if these in
fact be his true views) 117 are not infrequently met with hostility among
scholars, judges, and the public alike.
In fact, when the rubber of facts meets the road of Holmes’s theory upon
which the Pintos of the world drive, the logical implications of accepting
(let alone indulging) the bad men of the world seem unpalatable. With the
availability of punitive damages, it seems, the bad man need not be
113. Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand
that Helps or a Hand that Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 77, 131 n.279 (1990) (“In making its
cost-benefit analysis, Ford used the figures calculated by the National Highway Traffic and
Safety Association to be the value of human life ($200,000) and serious burn injury
($67,000). Using an estimation of 180 burn deaths and 180 serious burn injuries per year,
Ford calculated that the benefits that would be realized by adding safety devices to the
Pinto’s fuel tank, in terms of lives saved and injuries prevented, would equal approximately
$50 million dollars, whereas the associated costs would be $137 million dollars.” (citing S.
Kinghorn, Corporate Harm—A Structural Analysis of the Criminogenic Elements of the
Corporation 218 (1984) (unpublished dissertation))).
114. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (“There was evidence that Ford could
have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction
of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs
against corporate profits.”).
115. See generally Schwartz, supra note 101, at 1041–43; White, supra note 113.
116. Although the amount was later reduced to $3.5 million by the trial judge. See
Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
117. In Part III, I return to these facts to work out a more logical and palatable implication
of Holmes’s theory than has so far been represented here.
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indulged by the good people of this world. Yet, if punitive damages were
ever abolished or seriously limited, on the one hand, and the bad man were
allowed to continue running rampant over the legal landscape, on the other,
then indulge him we must, even if doing so would tend to produce the sort
of results seen in Grimshaw. Shockingly, this seems to have been the latest
move made by our courts, and it has happened in no less than the highest
court in the land. It is this most recent move that we turn to in the next
section.
C. The Bad Man’s Theory of Punitive Damages: From Punishment and
Deterrence to Predictability and Efficiency
[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even
Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some ability to know
what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.

— Justice David Souter, U.S. Supreme Court 118
Even in the uncertain world of punitive damages, one thing has always
been certain: this area of law has always been beyond the bad man’s reach.
This is because, since the first common law punitive damages cases were
decided more than two centuries ago, 119 courts have maintained120—and
118. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (Souter, J.) (citing
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459).
119. Common law courts first recognized punitive damages in 1763 in Wilkes v. Wood,
(1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.); Lofft, 1 and Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768
(K.B.); 2 Wils K.B. 205. A few decades later, the concept began to make its way into the
common law of the United States in the cases of Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 7
(1784) and Coryell v. Colbough, 1 N.J.L. (Coxe) 77 (1791). In Coryell, the judge instructed
the jury to award damages “for example’s sake, to prevent such offences in [the] future.”
Coryell, 1 N.J.L. (Coxe) at 77. The concept was subsequently acknowledged by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 370 (1851), where the court
held that “the jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages
upon a defendant” in certain instances, including “actions of trespass and all actions on the
case for torts.” Id.
The concept of punitive damages, of course, stretches back thousands of years and can be
found in sources as diverse as the Mosaic Law, see Exodus 22:9 (King James) (“For all
manner of trespass, whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of
lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before
the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbor.”);
the Code of Hammurabi, see THE CODE OF HAMMURABI ¶ 265, at 48 (L.W. King trans.,
NuVision Publications 2007) (c. 1780 B.C.E.) (“If a herdsman, to whose care cattle or sheep
have been entrusted, be guilty of fraud and make false returns of the natural increase, or sell
them for money, then shall he be convicted and pay the owner ten times the loss.”); the
Hittite Law and the Code of Manu, see James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive
Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984); the
Twelve Tables of the Romans, RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 345 (2002)
(noting that under the Twelve Tables, a “thief was required to pay quadruple damages (i.e.,
four-times the value of the objects that he had attempted to steal)”); Greek Law, see 1
ROBERT J. BONNER & GERTRUDE SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO
ARISTOTLE 78 (1938) (“The penalty [for assaulting a slave girl] was double the amount of
the injury.”); and even Egyptian Ptolemaic Law, see VERSTEEG, supra, at 165 (“As a rule, a
convicted thief had to return stolen goods to the individual to whom they belonged, and, in
addition, pay damages to the victim of double or triple (the cases vary) the value of the
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continue to maintain121—that punitive damages exist to punish and deter
present and future wrongdoers. Such twin goals, it would seem, speak
directly to the bad man who would engage in nefarious but profitable
conduct, for he must now be worried not only about the price he must pay
for his conduct in terms of compensatory damages, but the additional
punitive damages a court may impose to punish him and deter others from
engaging in such conduct. Punitive damages, in other words, were
traditionally reserved for those who intentionally engaged in prohibited
conduct whenever the price was right to do so (i.e., the bad man).
This makes the bad man’s recent appearance and use in the landmark
decision of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 122 a case decided by the highest
court in our land, all the more shocking. In Exxon, the Supreme Court has
seemingly made a radical departure from the principles that have governed
punitive damages for the last several hundred years by making the twin
pillars of punitive damages jurisprudence (punishment and deterrence)
stolen goods (what modern law might call ‘punitive damages’).”); see also id. at 185 (“[A]
thief had to return the stolen goods and pay double or triple their value, as a kind of punitive
damages.”).
120. See, e.g., Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498–99 (“Damages are designed not only as a
satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from
any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action
itself.”).
121. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (“Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years,
the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at
retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,
351 (2007) (“‘Punitive damages are awarded against a defendant to punish misconduct and
to deter misconduct,’ and ‘are not intended to compensate the plaintiff or anyone else for
damages caused by the defendant’s conduct.’” (quoting Joint Appendix at 283a, Philip
Morris USA, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 2147483)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“[C]ompensatory and punitive damages,
although usually awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, serve different
purposes. Compensatory damages ‘are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff
has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.’ By contrast, punitive damages
serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution.” (citations omitted)
(quoting Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001))); Cooper
Indus., 532 U.S. at 432 (“Although compensatory damages and punitive damages are
typically awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, they serve distinct purposes.
The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason
of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. The latter . . . operate as ‘private fines’ intended to
punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.” (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 903 (1979))); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“Punitive damages
may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition.”); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (“[P]unitive damages are
imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.”); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981) (“Punitive damages by definition are not intended to
compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was
intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.”); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (“[Punitive damages] are not compensation
for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”).
122. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (finding that punitive damages should not be so high as to
prevent an agent—like the bad man himself—from being able to predict the cost of violating
the law).
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harder to implement than ever before. As we shall soon see, not only has
the “bad man” been given free reign by the Supreme Court to ride
roughshod over the rights of others, but the Court has also taken the
remarkable and unprecedented step of announcing that the law, far from
being sacrosanct, may be broken by those who are willing and able to pay a
pre-specified price. 123
On March 23, 1989, Captain Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic
with a heightened tolerance for drink, 124 consumed an amount of alcohol
that would have made most non-alcoholics pass out 125 before attempting to
navigate the 900-foot long supertanker Exxon Valdez through the
dangerous, icy waters along the Prince William Sound. As it approached
midnight, Captain Hazelwood, realizing that the icy waters were in a worse
condition than usual, radioed the Coast Guard and asked for permission to
navigate the supertanker across “a less icy path” taken by the previous
outbound ship. 126 The Coast Guard approved the request, which traded one
danger for another by allowing Captain Hazelwood to avoid the icy waters
only by steering the supertanker around the dangerous Bligh Reef near the
Alaskan coast. Unfathomably, just two minutes before Captain Hazelwood
was required to make a turn around the reef, he inexplicably “put the tanker
on autopilot, speeding it up, making the turn trickier, and any mistake
harder to correct” 127 in order to retire to his cabin “to do paperwork.” 128 In
123. Even more importantly, the Supreme Court’s reasoning has already found its way
into our lower courts, where the Court’s initial misunderstanding of Holmes’s bad man, if
not checked, threatens to do particular damage. See, e.g., Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v.
Ganim, No. X06CV040184523S, 2008 WL 4926925, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31,
2008) (“As cogently expressed by the Supreme Court, ‘[a] penalty should be reasonably
predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’ “bad man” can look ahead with some
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another . . . . And
when the bad man’s counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty scheme they face
ought to threaten them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree when they wreak
like damage . . . . The common sense of justice would surely bar penalties that reasonable
people would think excessive for the harm caused in the circumstances.’” (citing Exxon, 128
S. Ct. at 2610)).
Although the metaphor of the bad man was not previously unknown to judges deciding
punitive damages cases, as illustrated in Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454
(Miss. 1983) (finding a Mississippi Chancery court is allowed to grant punitive damages
because the “bad man” could foresee the possibility of paying such damages) and Luban,
supra note 1 (discussing Holmes’s prediction theory, morality in the law, and the
relationship between punitive damages and the bad man), the Supreme Court’s recent
endorsement of the bad man approach to law is unprecedented, and illustrates how
dangerous a misunderstood idea may become.
124. Indeed, Captain Hazelwood had recently “completed a 28-day alcohol treatment
program while employed by Exxon, as his superiors knew, but dropped out of a prescribed
follow-up program and stopped going to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.” Exxon, 128 S.
Ct. at 2612. In fact, as the Supreme Court noted, drinking was nothing new to captain
Hazelwood, who could be found drinking “in bars, parking lots, apartments, airports,
airplanes, restaurants, hotels, at various ports, and aboard Exxon tankers.” Id.
125. Captain Hazelwood had “downed at least five double vodkas in the waterfront bars
of Valdez, an intake of about 15 ounces of 80-proof alcohol, enough ‘that a non-alcoholic
would have passed out.’” Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1236 (9th Cir.
2001).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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his stead, Captain Hazelwood placed Joseph Cousins, an unlicensed pilot,
and helmsman Robert Kagan, a non-officer, in charge of navigating the
supertanker around the Bligh Reef. 129 Unfortunately, Cousins and Kagan
failed to make the required turn, and the supertanker slammed into the reef,
tearing open the hull of the ship from which oil began to spill. At this
point, Captain Hazelwood rushed up from his cabin, where he “tried but
failed to rock the Valdez off the reef, a maneuver which could have spilled
more oil and caused the ship to founder.” 130 All in all, about eleven million
gallons of crude oil were spilled into the Price William Sound. 131 As for
Captain Hazelwood, it was estimated that his blood-alcohol level was about
.241, or “three times the legal limit for driving in most States,” at the time
of the oil spill. 132
After finding that both Exxon and Hazelwood were reckless, the jury
awarded $287 million in compensatory damages and assessed additional
punitive damages in the amount of $5 billion against Exxon and $5000
against Hazelwood. 133 The Ninth Circuit remitted the amount of punitives
to $2.5 billion, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, in part, to
determine whether the punitive damages were excessive. 134
After briefly tracing the history of punitive damages in England and
America, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the twin goals of
“retribution and deterring harmful conduct.” 135 It noted, however, that
“American punitive damages have been the target of audible criticism in
recent decades,” 136 and that much of this criticism revolves around “the
stark unpredictability of punitive awards.” 137 To reign in this “stark
unpredictability,” the Supreme Court invoked the help of Holmes’s bad
man, and held that: “[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its
severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2613.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2614.
134. Id. Although the case was decided under principles of maritime common law, a
recent search on Westlaw indicates that the case has already begun exerting influence over
punitive damages cases in general.
135. Id. at 2621.
136. Id. at 2624.
137. Id. at 2625. Interestingly, the Court came to its realization that punitive damages are
starkly unpredictable only several paragraphs after noting that
[a] survey of the literature reveals that discretion to award punitive damages has
not mass-produced runaway awards, and although some studies show the dollar
amounts of punitive-damages awards growing over time, even in real terms, by
most accounts the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has remained
less than 1:1. Nor do the data substantiate a marked increase in the percentage of
cases with punitive awards over the past several decades. The figures thus show
an overall restraint and suggest that in many instances a high ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages is substantially greater than necessary to punish or deter.
Id. at 2624–25 (footnotes omitted).
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ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or
another.” 138
The Supreme Court went on to state that:
Accordingly, given the need to protect against the possibility (and the
disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and
unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured retribution, we
consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above the median award, is a fair upper
limit in such maritime cases. 139

Here, then, is the first example ever of the highest court in our land not
only acknowledging, but endorsing, Holmes’s bad man, by helping him do
what he could never do before: calculate with certainty the cost of breaking
the law. Recall that, in Grimshaw, 140 the Ford Motor Company behaved as
one would generally predict Holmes’s bad man to behave, 141 but Ford
found its calculations less than reliable in significant part due to the jury’s
imposition of punitive damages. But now, with a 1:1 ratio representing the
upper limit of punitive to compensatory damages, a bad man can choose
with impunity among any number of nefarious activities so long as he is
rich enough to pay the legal price of his behavior, and will care little about
whether the damages imposed by a court are called “compensatory” or
“restitutionary” or even “punitive”—to him, it is all the same. 142
Once again, one can immediately see how useful such a theory would be
to the bad man. When followed, 143 such a theory allows him to predict,
with a fair degree of accuracy, how a court would rule, and thereby
provides him with external guidance (via the threat of possible sanctions)
regarding the appropriate precautions to take.
While the bad man must have been head over heels over the Supreme
Court’s recent ruling, a good man should be puzzled and, frankly, a bit
troubled by all of this. The good man should wonder whether the bad
man’s indulgence is either necessary or desirable, even if the Supreme
Court’s stated purpose of reigning in “stark unpredictability” of punitive

138. Id. at 2627 (citing Holmes, supra note 3, at 459).
139. Id. at 2633.
140. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see infra Part
II.B.
141. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 101, at 1041–44; see also Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr.
at 384 (“There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at
minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a costbenefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.”).
142. Holmes, supra note 3, at 461 (“[F]rom [the bad man’s] point of view, what is the
difference between being fined and being taxed a certain sum for doing a certain thing? . . .
What significance is there in calling one taking right and another wrong from the point of
view of the law? It does not matter, so far as the given consequence, the compulsory
payment, is concerned, whether the act to which it is attached is described in terms of praise
or in terms of blame, or whether the law purports to prohibit it or to allow it. If it matters at
all, still speaking from the bad man’s point of view, it must be because in one case and not in
the other some further disadvantages, or at least some further consequences, are attached to
the act by the law.”).
143. See supra note 111 (comparing scholarly commentary on judicial use of something
akin to the Hand formula prior to its formulation in Carroll Towing).
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damages is a noble one. And, at this point in the discussion, one may well
wonder whether Holmes’s theory is worth the paper it has been printed (and
reprinted) on, and whether we should not outright abandon a theory that
advocates the breaking of one’s solemn word whenever doing so is
profitable, allows one to commit negligence when the benefits exceed the
costs, and refuses to truly punish wrongdoers by making punitive damages
so predictable that a bad man will consider them as part of the cost of doing
business.
If these were in fact Holmes’s views, then the above-stated criticisms
would render his theory, in my view anyway, unpalatable. But as I argue in
the next part of this Article, Holmes’s views were much more complex, and
not only permit, but actually embrace, what has been previously thought to
be inconsistent with his views: a good man approach to law.
III. SLAYING HOLMES’S JURISPRUDENTIAL DRAGON: HOLMES’S BAD
MAN MEETS ARISTOTLE’S GOOD MAN
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill
him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.

— Oliver Wendell Holmes 144
One of the biggest mistakes people make when they read Holmes (who,
admittedly, invited such misinterpretations with his tendency to choose
words as much for their shock value as for the meaning they convey) is to
confuse Holmes’s enthusiasm for the bad man approach to law with a
certain enthusiasm towards helping the bad man himself. This approach,
for example, has been taken by several courts 145 and commentators, but
could not be further from Holmes’s actual intentions. Although Holmes
certainly spilled his fair share of ink discussing the bad man, Holmes did
not desire to help him but instead to advocate the separation of law and
morality for the simple purpose of facilitating clear thinking146 about the
144. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469.
145. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (Souter, J.); Bridgeport
Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim, No. X06CV040184523S, 2008 WL 4926925, at *12 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2008) (“As cogently expressed by the Supreme Court, ‘[a] penalty should
be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’ ‘bad man’ can look
ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or
another. . . . And when the bad man’s counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty
scheme they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree
when they wreak like damage . . . . The common sense of justice would surely bar penalties
that reasonable people would think excessive for the harm caused in the circumstances.’”
(quoting Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2610)).
146. Holmes, supra note 3, at 464 (“For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not
be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and
other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.
We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from ethical
associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very
much in the clearness of our thought.”).
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concept of law. 147 Because the bad man does not care about moral nature
of a right or a duty, but only about the legal consequences attached to
violating a right or failing to perform a duty, 148 Holmes thought that we
should attempt to see the world from the bad man’s eyes if we were ever to
truly understand the law.
But, many have wondered, does Holmes’s theory pay too much attention
to the bad man’s point of view? 149 If we are to truly understand the law,
should we not instead be concerned with the perspective of the good man,
who follows the law for conscience’s sake and probably represents how
most people behave and think about the law?150 And, if most people
actually think about the law from the perspective of the good man, would
not an internally based, good man view of the law tell us a lot more about
how the law actually works? Holmes would answer these critics in a word:
no.
In The Federalist No. 51, James Madison famously wrote: “If men were
angels, no government would be necessary.” 151 Coming from the pen of
the father of the Constitution, who was himself advocating a new form of
government, the implication was obvious: because men are not angels, a
successful form of government should take this fact into account. This
point could hardly have been lost on Holmes, who was himself advocating a
new theory of law, and must himself have recognized that a legal system
would be unnecessary among a population of angels or good men, who,
after all, could find their “reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.” 152 More to the point,
147. Recall that, according to Holmes, the bad man understood law as a prophecy about
what the courts would do in fact, i.e., in the event that a bad man violated a legal right, or
failed to perform a legal duty. See id. at 460–61 (“Take the fundamental question, What
constitutes the law? . . . [I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he
does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what
the . . . courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of this mind. The prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”).
148. Id. at 461 (“Take again a notion which as popularly understood is the widest
conception which the law contains;—the notion of legal duty, to which already I have
referred. We fill the word with all the content which we draw from morals. But what does it
mean to a bad man? Mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy that if he does certain things
he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory
payment of money.”).
149. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1773–74 (“Of what possible benefit can it be that the bad
man calculates with certainty the contours within which vice is unrestrained? Altruism
proposes an altogether different standard: the law is certain when not the bad but the
good man is secure in the expectation that if he goes forward in good faith, with due regard
for his neighbor’s interest as well as his own, and a suspicious eye to the temptations of
greed, then the law will not turn up as a dagger in his back. As for the bad man, let him
beware; the good man’s security and his own are incompatible.”).
150. See Hart, supra note 32, at 932. Discounting the importance of Holmes’s “bad man”
theory of law, Hart wrote that Holmes’s “conclusion . . . that law is something entirely
separate from morals,” and his suggestion that we see law from the bad man’s perspective,
was unhelpful at best, and would “make us more effective counsellors of evil” at worst. Id.
He went on to ask: “Do not lots of good men obey the law, even though they might not be
caught, and is not that fact important?” Id.
151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961).
152. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
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Holmes must have recognized, like Madison did, that in a government
populated by bad men, a legal system, if it is to be successful, should take
this fact into account. 153 Both men, it seemed, had the bad man on their
minds.
But why, in the case of either Madison or Holmes, should a successful
government or legal system take the bad man into account, and see the
world through the bad man’s eyes? One reason, which has already been
briefly touched upon, is purely descriptive: we should take the bad man
into account to better understand “[w]hat constitutes the law.” 154 We can
do this, according to Holmes, by stripping the law bare, and seeing how it
actually works in practice. Although this descriptive component was an
important part of Holmes’s agenda, it is too often emphasized as Holmes’s
primary aim, whereas it was actually the beginning of a larger normative
enterprise.
In an underappreciated passage of significant importance, Holmes
analogizes the bad man to a dragon for a very specific purpose:
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill
him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal. 155

Just as a knight would lure a dragon out of his cave and “count his teeth
and claws” 156 to see what sort of an enemy he is up against, so too would
someone like Madison or Holmes wish to see what sort of an enemy he is
up against by removing morality from the equation to see the world through
the bad man’s eyes. If this is all there was to Holmes’s agenda, we should
be very disappointed indeed, for the same reason that legal reformers are
disappointed with those within the critical legal studies movement who
would tear down sacred institutions while leaving nothing in their place.
But in the very next sentence, Holmes reveals a much grander normative
vision: the knight sizes up the dragon for the sake of doing one of two
things: taming him, or killing him. There is an analogue in our
understanding of the bad man. The knight is the good man, who must size
up the bad man not merely for the sake of understanding the law, but for the
purpose of making the law effective by either taming the bad man (i.e.,
reforming him internally), or killing him (i.e., imposing external sanctions
to reform him externally).

153. In fact, Holmes himself could have written: “If men were angels, no system of laws
would be necessary, but because the bad man exists, a system of law taking into account this
fact is necessary.”
154. Id. at 460; see Fisch, supra note 27, at 1595, 1612. Professor Jill E. Fisch notes that
although Holmes’s “bad man label is strikingly normative,” Holmes’s “purpose in describing
the separation of law and morals was to help us understand what the law is, not to argue for
what it should be.” Id.
155. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469.
156. Id.
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Thus, in response to our original question “why should a government or
legal system be preoccupied with the bad man?” Holmes provides two nonmutually exclusive explanations: one internal, and the other external.
First, one can focus on the bad man to reform his soul by making him
become more like a good man, thereby allowing him to better govern
himself, internally, through his more refined and developed inner “sanctions
of conscience.” 157 Alternatively, one can focus on the bad man with a
desire to shape his actions by making him behave more like a good man,
not for the purpose of actually making him good (though this would be a
welcome benefit), but to better deal with those recalcitrant individuals
through the external sanctions of the law who have proven that they are
beyond internal reform. In the remainder of this Article, I flesh out this
underappreciated portion of Holmes’s vision, and show how it makes a
difference in the way we ought to understand both Holmes’s theory and the
law itself. In the process, I hope to show Holmes’s theory as one that is
much more normatively palatable than has been previously acknowledged,
in that it focuses on the bad man not for his own sake, but for the sake of
the good man, at least so far as Holmes understood this term.
A. Bridging the Moral-Legal Divide Part I: Aristotle’s Good Man and the
Internal Point of View
The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is
the history of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, in
spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men.

— Oliver Wendell Holmes 158
Besides a seemingly offbeat reference Holmes made to taming a dragon,
what evidence do we have for believing that Holmes thought the bad man
could be reformed through the vehicle of law, a claim that has been
specifically doubted elsewhere? 159 Early in his speech, shortly after he
introduced the bad man in an attempt to “dispel a confusion between
morality and law,” 160 Holmes, recognizing the possibility that he might be
misunderstood, offered the following cautionary statement:
157. Id. at 459.
158. Id.
159. See KRONMAN, supra note 26, at 126 (“A bad man may become an expert in
[predicting how judges will behave] without ceasing to be bad, that is, without acquiring any
of the public-spirited concerns that motivate judges. Holmes assumed that a person can
possess an expert understanding of judicial behavior but continue to be bad himself. He
assumed, to put it differently, that the acquisition of such expertise does not require that one
be, or have the effect of turning one into, a good man motivated by the unselfish concerns of
a judge.”).
160. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459; see also id. at 459–60 (“The law is full of phraseology
drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from
one domain to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have the
boundary constantly before our minds.”); Robin West, Unenumerated Duties, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 221, 253 (2006) (“In an address called The Path of the Law, Holmes famously
worried over a century ago that our tendency to drench legal concepts in moralism would
render the former less than clear and most decidedly less than liberating.”).
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I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have to
say as the language of cynicism. The law is the witness and external
deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral
development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends
to make good citizens and good men. When I emphasize the difference
between law and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of
learning and understanding the law. For that purpose you must definitely
master its specific marks, and it is for that that I ask you for the moment
to imagine yourselves indifferent to other and greater things. 161

Unfortunately for Holmes, his request has been unkindly ignored since
the moment it was uttered. But if we take Holmes at his word and let him
speak for himself, he offers us several important clues regarding how the
law is to be understood. First, he makes clear that he believes that the law
is fundamentally moral, in that the laws that currently exist were, when they
were first promulgated, essentially moral laws, 162 and are still, in some
sense, limited by morality. 163 Further, he makes clear that he is not asking
us to disentangle morality from law to be a villain,164 but to help us
understand the law. 165 And third, in what must be the most ignored
sentence in all of Holmes’s writings, he believes that a proper
understanding of the law is important not for its own sake, but because, in
part, it allows one to “tame” (by reforming their behavior internally) those
who would transgress the law’s moral dictates through “practice” or
habit. 166
Holmes’s idea that a bad man may become good by habit is, somewhat
shockingly, a quintessentially Aristotelian idea, and could have been written
by the father of natural law himself. Indeed, viewed through an Aristotelian
lens, which Holmes himself peeked through from time to time, Holmes’s
thought takes on an entirely different significance. Several thousand years
before Holmes said that “[t]he practice of [law] tends to make good citizens
and good men,” 167 Aristotle himself recognized that “[m]oral goodness . . .
is the result of habit,” as “none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by
nature, since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave
differently by habituation.” 168 Thus, according to Aristotle, the only way of

161. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (emphasis added).
162. Id. (“The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the
history of the moral development of the race.”).
163. Id. at 460 (“No doubt simple and extreme cases can be put of imaginable laws which
the statute-making power would not dare to enact, even in the absence of written
constitutional prohibitions, because the community would rise in rebellion and fight; and this
gives some plausibility to the proposition that the law, if not a part of morality, is limited by
it.”).
164. Seipp, supra note 27, at 552 (“Holmes was ‘the bad man.’”).
165. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“When I emphasize the difference between law and
morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law.”).
166. Id. at 459, 469.
167. Id.
168. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 31; see also id. at 32 (“Men will become good builders
as a result of building well, and bad ones as a result of building badly. Otherwise there
would be no need of anyone to teach them: they would all be born either good or bad. Now
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becoming just was to act justly, for although “we are constituted by nature
to receive” moral virtues, “their full development in us is due to habit.”169
Of course, this begs the question: how does one begin to act justly in the
first place? As with Holmes, 170 Aristotle recognized that it was through the
practice of following just laws, which legislators have laid down for this
very purpose:
Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it:
people become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing
instruments. Similarly we become just by performing just acts, temperate
by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones. This
view is supported by what happens in city-states. Legislators make their
citizens good by habituation; this is the intention of every legislator, and
those who do not carry it out fail of their object. This is what makes the
difference between a good constitution and a bad one. 171

In this passage, Aristotle tells us that people become just by habit, and
individuals habitually practicing just laws will tend to internalize the
particular moral characteristics manifested in these external promulgations
of public morality. Further, he suggests that the lawmaker (and, by
extension, our common law judges) should legislate (or decide tough cases)
with this fact in mind. Furthermore, because Aristotle believed that
individuals do not possess moral goodness ex nihilo, 172 the internal good
man perspective cannot even begin to operate until moral content is poured
into an essentially amoral vessel, whereby what was once external begins
the process of ossification into an internal point of view. 173
It should be noted that, according to Aristotle, the bad man will never
truly become good until his acts become sufficiently internalized to become
what Holmes terms part of the good man’s inner “sanctions of
conscience.” 174 But, as Aristotle recognized, through practice175 this is
possible, and one could soon become virtuous 176 and good.
this holds good also of the virtues. It is the way that we behave in our dealings with other
people that makes us just or unjust . . . .”).
169. Id. at 31.
170. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“The practice of [the law], in spite of popular jests,
tends to make good citizens and good men.”).
171. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 32.
172. Id. (“Men will become good builders as a result of building well, and bad ones as a
result of building badly. Otherwise there would be no need of anyone to teach them: they
would all be born either good or bad.”).
173. Perhaps, indeed, the best way of beginning such a process is to impose external
sanctions, as per Holmes; for again, according to Aristotle, there are no internal standards
before this time to guide behavior.
174. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459; see ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 37. Aristotle himself
recognizes that
virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate way merely because they have a
certain quality [e.g., conforming to the external requirements imposed by law], but
only if the agent also acts in a certain state, that is (1) if he knows what he is doing,
(2) if he chooses it, and chooses it for its own sake [i.e., not for the sake of
avoiding a legal sanction], and (3) if he does it from a fixed and permanent
disposition.
Id. (second emphasis added).
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Because it was Holmes who, perhaps better than anyone else, articulated
a theory that can help realize Aristotle’s dream of making men virtuous—if
not initially due to the good man’s own inner conscious, then due to the bad
man’s continual practice 177—he is probably better thought of as the good
man’s friend than the law’s villain. Indeed, there is no incompatibility with
encouraging the good man to be governed by his inner “sanctions of
conscience,” on the one hand, and attempting to reform the moral fabric of
the bad man by requiring him to perform just actions for the purpose of
becoming just, on the other. In fact, it may be argued, Holmes’s bad man
theory of law does a better job of making men virtuous than a purely
internal point of view, for as Aristotle himself recognized, the difficulty in
saying that “people must perform just actions if they are to become just” is
that those who “do what is just and temperate . . . are just and temperate
already.” 178 This, indeed, is the contradiction of the internal framework.
Holmes’s theory, far from being unfavorably disposed toward the good
man, helps add to his ranks, whereas a purely internal theory would not be
capable of helping those who are not already good and just become good
and just.
If Aristotle and Holmes are correct, then the practice of law, at least
where such laws are just, will increase the ranks of good men. There will,
however, always be those who remain, despite the best efforts of the good
man, bad. For these “dragons of the law” who have failed to internalize the
law’s inner teachings, 179 we, like the knight, will need another weapon to
fight them. That sword, according to Holmes, is the external sanction.
B. Bridging the Moral-Legal Divide Part II: Holmes’s Bad Man and the
External Point of View
A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and
practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to
avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he
can.

— Oliver Wendell Holmes 180

175. Which can be supplied with the gentle prodding of external sanctions, as will be
discussed in Part III.C, infra.
176. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 37–38 (“[I]t is from the repeated performance of just
and temperate acts that we acquire virtues.”).
177. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“The practice of [law], in spite of popular jests, tends
to make good citizens and good men.”); cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 37 (“[P]eople must
perform just actions if they are to become just . . . .”); id. at 31 (“Moral goodness . . . is the
result of habit.”).
178. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 37.
179. Or, worse yet, have internalized the bad man’s point of view. See, e.g., Alschuler,
supra note 27, at 375 n.84 (“[M]y argument is that ‘the bad man has crept into the collective
unconscious of the legal profession.’ Once people internalize the ‘bad man’ perspective, the
assumption that easily evaded law is not law becomes routine. Because that is what Holmes’
definition says, it encourages the view that taking advantage of loopholes is unproblematic
and that nearly everyone will do so.”).
180. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
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In the previous section I discussed how Holmes’s bad man theory of law
reflects, in part, an Aristotelian theory of law that recognized law’s ability
to help make the bad man good through his habit of continually practicing
(or obeying) just laws. In this section, I discuss Holmes’s specific focus on
those individuals who, despite the best attempts of the good man,
nevertheless fail to internalize the law’s inner morality. For these
individuals, according to Holmes, we can never hope to explain how the
law actually works by recourse to a purely internal point of view. More
specifically, if one views—as Holmes did—a legislature’s or judge’s 181 job
as requiring the making, interpreting, and applying of laws for a population
containing few angels, one will probably experience little success dealing
with these bad men of the law without adopting an external view of law.
The remainder of this section attempts to show why this is so.
Holmes’s external view of law, of course, has been heavily criticized
over the years. Some have accused it as being antagonistic to the good man
approach to law, 182 corrupting, 183 misplaced, 184 and woefully
incomplete.185 To look at the matter this way, it seems to me, is to
completely misread Holmes. As I have argued above, 186 Holmes was
sensitive to the internal point of view, and recognized that “[t]he law is the
witness and external deposit of our moral life” and encapsulated “the
history of the moral development of the race.” 187 His focus on the external
181. It is important to note that Holmes thought of judges as legislators or “‘law-makers,’
continuously engaged in making and revising ‘policies’ to provide ‘expedient’ solutions for
new social problems.” ROSENBERG, supra note 74, at 4.
182. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1773–74 (“Of what possible benefit can it be that the bad
man calculates with certainty the contours within which vice is unrestrained? Altruism
proposes an altogether different standard: the law is certain when not the bad but the
good man is secure in the expectation that if he goes forward in good faith, with due regard
for his neighbor’s interest as well as his own, and a suspicious eye to the temptations of
greed, then the law will not turn up as a dagger in his back. As for the bad man, let him
beware; the good man’s security and his own are incompatible.”).
183. Hart, supra note 32, at 932 (arguing that Holmes’s suggestion that we see law from
the bad man’s perspective, was unhelpful at best, and would “make us more effective
counsellors of evil” at worst).
184. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 39–40 (1961) (wondering why the law should
be concerned exclusively with the “bad man” rather than, for example, the “puzzled man” or
the “ignorant man” or with the “man who wishes to arrange his affairs,” all of whom are
“willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what it is”).
185. See, e.g., id. (“It is of course very important, if we are to understand the law, to see
how the courts administer it when they come to apply its sanctions. But this should not lead
us to think that all there is to understand is what happens in courts.”); Hart, supra note 32, at
932 (“Do not lots of good men obey the law, even though they might not be caught, and is
not that fact important?”); Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287, 1295 (2006) (“Much modern theorizing about law has failed to
recognize the full importance of maintaining and cultivating the internal point of view
among the citizenry. The ‘bad man’ theory of legal obligation is perhaps the most
conspicuous failure in this regard. When Holmes gave his famous ‘bad man’ speech, ‘The
Path of the Law,’ at Boston University School of Law, he was advising students on the best
way to think of legal obligation and, therefore, the best way to advise clients. . . . Yet, it is
hardly the best way to preserve and cultivate the internal point of view among the citizenry
to have lawyers advising clients by taking the external point of view.”).
186. See supra Part III.A.
187. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
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point of view, therefore, was undertaken not to disparage the internal point
of view, but to strengthen it by protecting its most devout practitioners—the
good men.
Our first job, therefore, is to dispel the myth that adopting an external
view of the law automatically entails a rejection of the internal, good man
approach to law. No less a figure than Aristotle himself, the father of virtue
ethics and firm believer that laws should be enacted to make more men
virtuous, adopted an external (and anachronistically Holmesian) view of
law:
For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man
or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has
committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the
injury, and treats the parties as equals, if one is in the wrong and the other
is being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received
it. 188

These words, it seems, could have been penned by Holmes himself! But
why would the developer of the good man approach adopt a purely external
approach? What, in other words, can be gained by such a move?
As discussed earlier, 189 Aristotle, like Holmes, understood that people
tend to become just by following just laws, and saw this as a normatively
important component of the law. But Aristotle, like Holmes, also
recognized that the internal point of view could only explain why those who
had already internalized law’s inner morality behaved as they did. It could
say little, however, about how people came to behave morally in the first
place, or why those who rejected law’s inner morality still appeared to
conform to the law’s dictates, and appeared to behave as though they were
moral and as though they were governed by the same “sanctions of
conscience” as the good man himself. According to Holmes, one cannot
hope to explain the behavior of these individuals, or to understand how
legislatures and judges might affect their behavior, without recourse to an
external point of view, and it is for this reason that Holmes adopted such a
view.
It must be remembered that Holmes dedicated his life to the law, and
understood, perhaps better than anyone else, that law not only had its basis
in morality, 190 but depended for its very existence on the continuing support
of the community. 191 But he served in the Civil War and sat on the federal
and state bench as well, and knew from these experiences that many
individuals were not governed by their “vaguer sanctions of conscience,”

188. 2 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE
REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION bk. V, 1132a2–a9, 1132a19, at 1786 (Jonathan Barnes ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
189. See supra Part III.A.
190. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“The law is the witness and external deposit of our
moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.”).
191. Id. at 460 (“I once heard the late Professor Agassiz say that a German population
would rise if you added two cents to the price of a glass of beer. A statute in such a case
would be empty words, not because it was wrong, but because it could not be enforced.”).
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but needed external sanctions to shape their behavior to the general
standards adopted by the community. Therefore, for Holmes, the purpose
of adopting the external point of view was to understand how the law
actually works to impose order on those initially resistant, and the best way
of doing this was, in Holmes’s view, to understand the bad man. 192
So how, exactly, is the bad man to be understood? What, exactly, guides
his behavior? First, it must be recalled that a bad man will not look to the
law as a statement of right and wrong, for morality does not play a role in
his calculations. Nor will the bad man be compelled to follow the law’s
commands out of a desire to become a good man himself, or out of any
deep respect for those who make (or follow) the law. Rather, the bad man
will only understand law in terms of the “material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict,” 193 and will therefore only look at the
material consequences, i.e., the predicted punishment 194 that will be
imposed on him for violating the law, in deciding whether or not to comply
with the law’s demands. 195 Indeed, it is this view—the bad man’s view that
violation of the law is a “cost of doing business” whenever the bad man’s
business runs counter to the spirit and letter of the law—to which courts and
commentators most often object.196
So how, exactly, does Holmes’s bad man decide upon a course of action?
According to Professor Albert W. Alschuler, the bad man acts even worse
than Holmes himself imagined:
Holmes should have visited with the bad man longer. Contrary to what
this scoundrel told Holmes, he did not care two straws for what the

192. Id. at 469 (“When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.”).
193. Id. at 459.
194. Holmes refers to this as the bad man’s “prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact.” Id. at 461; see also Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909)
(Holmes, J.) (defining law as “a statement of the circumstances in which the public force
will be brought to bear upon men through the courts”); 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra
note 37, at 212 (“It starts from my definition of law (in the sense in which it is used by the
modern lawyer), as a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will be
brought to bear upon men through the courts: that is the prophecy in general terms.”).
195. It is for this reason that Holmes said, nearly a full century before the law and
economics movement really gained momentum, that the “man of the future” is the man of
economics, Holmes, supra note 3, at 469, for it is the economist who will best understand the
cost-benefit analyses in which the bad man engages whenever deciding whether or not to
obey a certain law.
196. Indeed, the “bad man” view of the law has been cited as a reason to dismiss an
argument by the losing party, as in Goldberg v. City of Atl. City, 4 N.J. Tax 195 (N.J. Tax Ct.
1982), where the court, citing General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649
(2d Cir. 1974), agreed that the rules of professional conduct are not written for a bad man
reading and held that a law firm cannot gain consent to a conflict of interest when a public
interest is involved, contrary to the firm’s argument. Goldberg, 4 N.J. Tax at 200, 213.
Similarly, the “bad man” view of the law has been cited by judges as a reason to interpret a
statute in a particular way so to prevent promoting a “bad man” style of interpreting a
statute, as in Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346 (Miss. 1986), where a
dissenting justice argued that the government should not be indifferent to a hotel’s choice
when the hotel chose to violate the law and pay penalties for violation of a local alcoholic
beverage control law. Id. at 356–57 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
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Massachusetts or English courts would do in fact. He cared what the
sheriff would do. The sheriff, not the courts, had the guns, the padlocks,
the battering rams, the handcuffs, the nightsticks, the dogs, the deputies,
and the jails. What the courts did might predict what the sheriff would
do, just as axioms and deductions might predict what the courts would do.
In the end, however, the bad man was concerned about the sheriff. If,
after the courts had spoken, the sheriff would take a bribe and permit the
bad man to flee to Rio, the bad man would laugh at the axioms, the
deductions, the courts of Massachusetts, and the courts of England all
together. 197

Although written somewhat facetiously and intended as a criticism of
Holmes’s theory, this statement is not really that troublesome for Holmes
after all. The problem, in fact, with Professor Alschuler’s statement is not
that it goes too far, but that it does not go far enough. The bad man, it will
be shown, is worried about much more than Alschuler himself imagined.
So what is a bad man concerned about when deciding upon a particular
course of (potentially illegal) action? First and foremost, he is wondering
whether he will be caught, and therefore cares about the probability that
someone will report him. Next, he wants to know whether, if reported, he
will be captured, and therefore is interested in the probability of the sheriff
arresting him. If arrested, he is worried about the chance of being charged
with an offense, and wants to know about the prosecutor who may
prosecute him, the jury who may determine his guilt or innocence, and the
judge who may sentence him, in order to determine how likely he is to pass
through this ordeal unscathed.
And he also wants to know the
consequences attached to each of these events. How bad, after all, will
prison, or a fine, really be? For this, the bad man will want to know about
the warden in charge of his prison, the guards who will oversee his
activities, and the other prisoners who he may be locked up with, and on,
and on, and on. 198
In short, at each stage of analysis, what the bad man really cares about is
the probability of a cost (broadly defined) being imposed on him, multiplied
by the quantum of that cost. 199 Behind this logic is Holmes’s assumption
197. Alschuler, supra note 27, at 372.
198. See Fisch, supra note 27, at 1597 (“An additional concern is the extent to which the
bad man will be constrained by legal sanctions. Some commentators have worried that, in
predicting the cost of disobeying the law, the bad man will not simply calculate the cost of
legal sanctions, but will further consider the likelihood that those sanctions will be imposed.
Robert Gordon terms this a ‘restate[ment] . . . [of the Holmesian] “bad man’s” view of legal
rules as prices discounted by sanctions—or, to reduce it still further, by the probability of
enforcement of sanctions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Robert W. Gordon, A New Role
for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2003))
(citing Williams, supra note 71, at 1291)). Professor Fisch ultimately rejects this view,
however, and notes that “[a]lthough this reading of Holmes is plausible, I do not
read Holmes as incorporating the risk of nonenforcement into the bad man’s calculation.” Id.
199. Because Holmes was originally giving his speech to law students (i.e., future
lawyers), it is probably the case that he was concerned about how they ought to understand
the law, and probably formulated his bad man theory with them in mind, rather than the bad
man himself. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Holmes Versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal
Theory, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE, supra note 26, at 158, 179 (explaining
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that, although the bad man cannot be influenced by morality, he is by nature
a rational animal, 200 and can be influenced by the threat of sanctions.201
The bad man, in short, is the calculating man. 202
This understanding allows us to see what we are up against by, in
Holmes’s words, getting “the dragon out of his cave” and “count[ing] his
teeth and claws, and see[ing] just what is his strength.” 203 But Holmes is
also quick to remind us that this “is only the first step.” 204 We—and here
Holmes was speaking primarily to the good men among us—must next
decide “either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.”205
But how, exactly, does one accomplish this? In the very next sentence,
Holmes tells us that it is through economics: “For the rational study of the
law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.” 206
It is “the man of statistics and the master of economics” who is best
equipped to deal with the bad man’s behavior, not only by understanding
that the bad man is, at his core, a calculating man 207 motivated by external
sanctions, 208 but by understanding how best to manipulate these sanctions
to influence the bad man’s behavior for the good of the entire polity.209

that Holmes is predicting the law not from the bad man’s point of view about the probability
of enforcement, but from the perspective of courts and legislatures about the threat of legal
liability). However, in either case, Holmes was fundamentally concerned about a prediction,
or what Holmes calls a “prophecy” of what the enforcement authorities would do on a going
forward basis.
A bad man contemplating his crime at an early stage, of course, generally needed to take
a lot more factors into account (i.e., make more predictions) than a lawyer advising his client
about the legal ramifications of acts already committed, but both the bad man and his lawyer
were in the business of predicting. In other words, Holmes probably assumed in articulating
his thesis that lawyers were not generally in the business of advising their clients, from the
beginning, as to whether or not they should break a contract, break into a home, or punch a
person in the nose. Rather, Holmes seemed to assume that the client has already broken her
contract, or entered into a home, or punched another in the nose, and the lawyer is now being
called upon to advise his or her client of the possible repercussions, or to predict, in other
words, what a court was likely to do.
200. Here again we see affinities with Aristotle, who defined man as a “rational animal.”
See William C. French, Natural Law and Ecological Responsibility: Drawing on the
Thomistic Tradition, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 12, 18 (2008).
201. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is
believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid
being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.”).
202. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 298 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1960) (“Men calculate,
some with less exactness, indeed, some with more: but all men calculate. I would not say,
that even a madman does not calculate.”).
203. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. BENTHAM, supra note 202, at 298.
208. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459.
209. HOLMES, supra note 47, at 36 (“The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that
it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right
or wrong.”).
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Elaborating on this point several paragraphs later, Holmes discusses how it
is through economics that the good man judge will be able
to consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them,
and the cost. We learn that for everything we have to give up something
else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other
advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when we elect. 210

Holmes, in other words, understood that courts were in the business of
“making policies that necessarily balanced the conflicting interests of
different classes and ideologies vying for ascendance in the harsh and
crowded conditions of industrial society.” 211 Therefore, for Holmes, we
ought to begin by recognizing “the legal reality of judges exercising a
discretionary power to make policies motivated not by dictates of logic but
by ‘experience’ of the ‘relative worth and importance of competing
legislative grounds’ of social needs and values.” 212
Understood in this context, it now becomes clear why Holmes said that
although the man of the present may be the doctrinal black-letter man, the
man of the future would be the man of economics. For only with an
understanding of the costs and benefits of a particular policy could one be
in the position to choose the best policy for the polity.
The external point of view, therefore, far from abandoning the good man
view of law or, worse, abandoning the “concepts of right and wrong—[and]
values,” 213 actually helps further the good man’s agenda. It promotes the
concepts of right and wrong, at least as these values—which are brought
about by weighing the cost of the bad man’s conduct and the law’s interest
in deterring him against the costs of enforcing the legal rules necessary to
“tame” or immobilize the bad man—are understood by the community
practicing them.
Thus, at its core, Holmes’s insistence on the separation of law and
morality exists to help us understand the bad man view of law, which in
turn helps us understand why the bad man behaves as he does, 214 which in
210. Holmes, supra note 3, at 474.
211. ROSENBERG, supra note 74, at 3.
212. Id. (quoting HOLMES, supra note 47, at 5; Holmes, supra note 3, at 466).
213. Robert Henry, The Value(s) of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: Through a Magic
Mirror Darkly, THE GREEN BAG, Autumn 2001, at 105, 105 (reviewing ALSCHULER, supra
note 26). Those who suggest that Holmes advocated a purely external point of view for
understanding the law are therefore only right in part. And those scholars who suggest, as
Alschuler does, that Holmes was revolting not “against formalism or against a priori
reasoning,” but instead “against the objective concepts of right and wrong—against values,”
id., could not be further from the truth.
214. Holmes, supra note 3, at 459 (“The first thing for a business-like understanding of
the matter is to understand its limits, and therefore I think it desirable at once to point out
and dispel a confusion between morality and law, which sometimes rises to the height of
conscious theory, and more often and indeed constantly is making trouble in detail without
reaching the point of consciousness. You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much
reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore
you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man
who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is
likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to
keep out of jail if he can.”).
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turn helps us deter the bad man, which in turn helps us protect the good
man.
C. Bridging the Moral-Legal Divide Part III: Aristotle’s Good Man Meets
Holmes’s Bad Man—the Mixed Approach
I have previously discussed Holmes’s acknowledgment of the internal,
good man approach to law, 215 and have argued that his adoption of the
external, bad man approach to law, far from ignoring the good man,
actually operates to his benefit.216 In this section, I show how Holmes did
not view the internal and external approaches to law as mutually exclusive,
but as mutually complementary, and believed that these approaches can and
should be synthesized not only in a normatively satisfying manner, but in a
very particular way. Specifically, I argue that Holmes believed that
although the good man approach to law was important, it was also, in and
of itself, inadequate, in that the adoption of a good man approach to law
would not necessarily lead to more good men.
This point was in fact recognized over two thousand years ago by
Aristotle, who—again in words that could have been penned by Holmes
himself—not only acknowledged that “a man becomes just by the
performance of just, and temperate by the performance of temperate, acts,”
as we have already seen, but further recognized that there does not exist
“the smallest likelihood of any man’s becoming good by not doing [good
and just acts].” 217
In this important passage, Aristotle argues that good hearts are not
enough to make a person just; 218 rather, good acts of the sort contemplated
by legislatures and judges when they make new laws are necessary as well.
Holmes also understood this fact, and frequently acknowledged that a good
heart coupled with a bad act was still rightly punishable by law. 219 A
purely internal point of view, it seems, was rejected by both Aristotle and
Holmes as unable to explain how the law actually worked.
But so was the purely external point of view. Aristotle recognized that
good acts practiced by the bad man due only to the threat of external
sanctions are, in and of themselves, insufficient to make the bad man good.
For a bad man to become good, the good act must be performed with a

215. See supra Part III.A.
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 38.
218. Aristotle thought that a person with a good heart who failed to perform good acts,
but who nevertheless considered himself just, was “like [an] invalid[] who listen[s] carefully
to their doctor, but carr[ies] out none of his instructions. Just as the bodies of the latter will
get no benefit from such treatment, so the souls of the former will get none from such
philosophy.” Id.
219. HOLMES, supra note 47, at 33 (“[W]hile the terminology of morals is still retained,
and while the law does still and always, in a certain sense, measure legal liability by moral
standards, it nevertheless, by the very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting those
moral standards into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party
concerned is wholly eliminated.”).
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good heart. 220 Turning to Holmes, this view seems to suggest, at first blush
anyway, that it is impossible for the bad man to ever become good, for the
bad man is someone who, by definition, is not moved to act based on his
internal conscience, but out of fear of external sanctions. He is incapable,
in other words, of uniting the good heart with the good act. But Holmes, in
fact, thought that these approaches could be synthesized, and acknowledged
that although the bad man may behave justly only by threat of external
sanctions, and therefore not be just himself, the bad man may, over time,
come to internalize the behavior he has repeatedly practiced, even though
such practice was originally motivated by threat of external sanctions:
If I do live with others they tell me that I must do and abstain from doing
various things or they will put the screws on to me. I believe that they
will, and being of the same mind as to their conduct I not only accept the
rules but come in time to accept them with sympathy and emotional
affirmation and begin to talk about duties and rights. 221

In this remarkable passage, Holmes demonstrates how the bad man, who
originally behaves in a certain way and follows certain laws only to avoid
having “the screws” put on to him, may, through habituation and continual
practice, come to “accept [these rules] with sympathy,” and will soon come
to follow the law not due to his fear of the law’s external sanctions, but due
to his internal respect for the law’s inner principles, which now reside deep
within his “sanctions of conscience.” Holmes therefore demonstrates how,
by first distinguishing morality from law and analytically separating the
internal and external points of view, one may come to understand what the
bad man view of law has to offer the legislator or judge by way of
reforming the bad man and protecting the good,222 thereby allowing the
purely external point of view to be synthesized with the purely internal
point of view to constitute a descriptively complete 223 and normatively
220. ARISTOTLE, supra note 84, at 38 (“Acts, to be sure, are called just and temperate
when they are such as a just or temperate man would do; but what makes the agent just or
temperate is not merely the fact that he does such things, but the fact that he does them in the
way that just and temperate men do.”).
221. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918).
222. Professor Robin West came close to grasping this insight when he wrote (but did not
see that Holmes himself would have agreed, and suggested as much himself):
[I]t might behoove us to attend to the negative implication of Holmes’ The Path of
the Law argument. Maybe Holmes was right when he insisted we should think
about the law’s mandates from the perspective of the “bad man.” But it might also
be true (in fact it might even follow from that Holmesian claim) that we should
think about the distinctively moral questions regarding what lawmakers ought to
do, including those moral questions with constitutional overtones, from the
perspective of the moral man or woman who legislates, rather than so relentlessly
from the perspective of the bad man who seeks to minimize law’s impact. There
are likely strong moral arguments to the effect that legislators are under moral
imperatives to use their power for good . . . .
West, supra note 160, at 254–55.
223. The view is descriptively complete because it does not pit the internal point of view
against the external point of view, but recognizes that both operate coextensively, and that
many rational individuals consider both the external ramifications of their actions and the
internal rightness or wrongness of their behavior before engaging in many forms of conduct.
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satisfying 224 vision of law. 225 Under Holmes’s approach, in sum, the bad
man may become the good 226 man. 227
Even so great a legal philosopher as H.L.A. Hart seems to have missed
this point. In his otherwise impressive work, The Concept of Law, Hart
noted that one of the problems with Holmes’s bad man approach to law was
that it assumed individuals only act to avoid sanctions, thereby defining the
internal point of view “out of existence.” 228 But this way of thinking,
though common, 229 reads only one half of Holmes while ignoring the other.
224. The view is also normatively satisfying because it better protects the good man by
more effectively deterring the bad man, while converting him to the good man’s cause.
225. See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 1213 (“[While] the bad man adopts only an
external perspective on the law [and] looks at law as a basis for predicting what others will
do[,] . . . the person who seizes the law’s internal aspect will look at legal restrictions as a
signal that he should behave in a certain way; it provides him with a reason for behaving as
the law demands.”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 603 (1996) (“The law can discourage [conduct] not just by ‘raising the cost’ of
such behavior through punishments, but also through instilling aversions to the kinds of
behavior that the law prohibits.”); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights
Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1401 (1999) (“[T]he most effective form of lawenforcement is not the imposition of external sanction, but the inculcation of internal
obedience.”); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 75 (2007) (“General deterrence operates not only, or even primarily,
through external restraints, that is, because subjects hear and fear the relevant sovereign’s
commands backed by threats. The criminal law also deters through its long-term role in
shaping, strengthening, and inculcating values, which encourages the development of
habitual, internal restraints . . . .”).
226. The word “good” should not be taken in an absolutist sense here, for Holmes
believed in a sort of relativistic truth based on the will of the majority, see, e.g., Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority has a
right “to embody their opinions in law”), and not in anything like the idea of natural rights
and natural law. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 221, at 41 (“The jurists who believe in natural
law seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and
accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men
everywhere.”); see also Harold J. Laski, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 40
YALE L.J. 683, 685 (1931) (“Mr. Justice Holmes’ political outlook is a rejection of absolutist
concepts. All principles are true in merely a relative way. The individual is not a subject of
rights which the state is not entitled to invade. Men are social animals; and what they are
entitled to do is a matter of degree, born of experience in some particular time and place. . . .
So he rejects the idea of natural law. . . . And with the idea of natural law there goes also the
idea of rights which, a little scornfully perhaps, he has defined as the ‘hypostasis of a
prophecy.’”).
227. Or the self-reliant man, see, e.g., Levinson & Balkin, supra note 27 (suggesting that
just as Holmes was influenced by Emerson, so too was Holmes’s bad man influenced by (or,
at the very least, can be better understood by reference to) Emerson’s self-reliant man), or
the reasonable man, see, e.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 156 Eng. Rep.
1047 (Ex.); 11 Ex. 781 (opinion of Baron Alderson), in which the reasonable man of tort law
was given shape. As an added benefit, even if, at the end of the day, Holmes’s bad man
approach does not, through habit, make good men (or self-reliant men, or reasonable men) of
these previously bad men, any objective outsider judging this person’s conduct would still
not be able to tell the difference, so long as the threat of sanctions made the bad man behave
as though he were good. And that, for Holmes and probably for many of us as well, is about
as much as we could ever ask of the law.
228. HART, supra note 8, at 91.
229. See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point of View? 4 (Oct. 14, 2006)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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As we have just seen, Holmes did not assume that individuals only acted to
avoid sanctions but recognized in no uncertain terms that individuals were
also governed by their inner “sanctions of conscience.” As a judge,
however, Holmes was well aware that many individuals were not so
governed, and it was these individuals who posed the greatest threat to the
polity, in general, and to the good man, in particular. Holmes therefore
encouraged us to focus on these individuals, not in order to define the
internal point of view “out of existence,” as Hart maintains, but to preserve
and strengthen the “internal point of view” by protecting its practitioners,
i.e., the good man, while simultaneously converting the bad man to his
cause. Holmes’s vision, like Aristotle’s, suggests that the law has a much
more important role to play than merely deterring or punishing nefarious
conduct: it has a role to play in shaping good conduct as well.230
Although it would take several full-length articles to fully sketch out the
implications of applying a mixed Aristotelian/Holmesian approach to the
areas of contracts, torts, and punitive damages, a few brief thoughts can be
offered at this time.
First, we must remember that the
Aristotelian/Holmesian mixed approach does not exist for the sake of the
bad man, but for the good man. This means that, while the bad man will
himself feel deterred within the operation of these rules, and will therefore
be more willing to obey laws with large penalties attached, and more likely
to break laws with small penalties attached, a judge applying these rules
ought not feel constrained to adjudicate the case according to the bad man’s
calculus. Rather, the judge ought to take the laws as they currently exist
into account not for the purpose of applying them as written, as would
Holmes’s eighteenth-century “black-letter man,” but should consider the
papers.cfm?abstract_id=937337 (“The problem with Holmes’ theory, rather, is that he
privileges one type of insider’s point of view over another. By focusing solely on the
perspective of the bad man, sanction-centered theories define the other point of view,
namely, the internal point of view, out of existence.”).
230. This analysis, of course, applies to the vast swath of law that also happens to be just,
but none of this is to say that laws cannot be unjust, and thereby followed for the wrong
reasons. Holmes has something to say about this phenomenon as well, and encourages us to
carefully reconsider our law on a periodic basis, and remove those laws that no longer serve
important social functions. See Holmes, supra note 3, at 469 (“It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”). When such laws are encountered,
one must throw them out and begin anew by acting as “the man of statistics and the master
of economics” would, and “consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of
attaining them, and the cost.” Id. at 469, 474. In considering these ends, of course, even the
economist must look beyond economics itself to the social good desired by the people
themselves. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority has a right “to embody their opinions in law”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that efficiency theory cannot adjudicate
between values but it can “clarify a value conflict by showing how much of one value—
efficiency, surely an important, if not necessarily paramount, value in any society—must be
sacrificed to achieve another”). What shape will these opinions take? There is every reason
to believe they will take a moral shape, and may, in turn, be based on any number of theories
of social justice, ranging from consequentialist (e.g., utilitarianism) to deontological (e.g.,
Kantian) to virtue-based (e.g., Aristotelian) theories of justice.
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bad man’s calculus in the context of the social policies embedded within
these laws, as would the contemporary Holmesian “man of statistics and the
master of economics.”
1. The Mixed Theory of Contracts
As discussed above, the bad man theory of contracts, as it is traditionally
understood, has been criticized on a number of grounds. If, as some
moralists believe, “[a]n individual is morally bound to keep his
promises” 231 and such promises, when enforced, “foster a society in which
people can confidently rely on each other,” 232 then it is easy to see why
some commentators would depict a society in which promises are kept for
internal reasons as “morally superior to the state of constrained avarice
depicted by ‘badman’ theories of legal obligation.” 233
Indeed, because Holmes’s view of contracts is generally seen as the
source of modern efficient breach theory, detractors usually criticize
Holmes as its source before going on to attack the theory directly. 234 For
instance, Professor Daniel Friedmann attacks Holmes’s way of looking at
contract remedies as unacceptable, both normatively and descriptively,235
and rhetorically asks:
Why not generalize the proposition so that every person has an “option”
to transgress another’s rights and to violate the law, so long as he is
willing to suffer the consequences? The legal system could thus be
viewed only as establishing a set of prices, some high and some low,
which then act as the only constraints to induce lawful conduct. 236

Why not indeed!
respond:

Were Holmes reading this today, he might well

I have already generalized the proposition in such a manner, and indeed I
have derived the specific proposition to which you cite from my broader
231. FRIED, supra note 50, at 16.
232. Farber & Matheson, supra note 70, at 942.
233. Id.
234. Perillo is one of few scholars who argues against the theory of efficient breach while
denying that Holmes was its author. See Perillo, supra note 54; see also Friedmann, supra
note 64.
235. Friedmann, supra note 64 (arguing that the theory fails normatively by undermining
entitlement to contract promises, barring a bargained-for release from them; and
descriptively by introducing inefficiency rather than efficiency through generating expensive
transactions—e.g., litigation—rather than avoiding or reducing them). Friedmann analyzes
Holmes’s fundamental error as the “conclusion that the remedy provides a perfect substitute
for the right, when in truth the purpose of the remedy is to vindicate that right, not to replace
it.” Id. at 1. However much one disagrees with Holmes, one should at least attempt to
understand him correctly. Holmes did not believe legal rights stood alone. For Holmes, one
had a legal right merely to the extent that one had a legal remedy: “One of the many evil
effects of the confusion between legal and moral ideas . . . is that theory is apt to get the cart
before the horse, and to consider the right or the duty as something existing apart from and
independent of the consequences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added
afterward. But, as I shall try to show, a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if
a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment
of the court;—and so of a legal right.” Holmes, supra note 3, at 458.
236. Friedmann, supra note 64, at 1.
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theory of the bad man. Your question, if anything, proves my point. The
law does exactly as you say: it establishes a set of prices. And the bad
man, caring as he does only for the external sanctions that may be
imposed from without, rather than any moral law emanating from within,
looks at the matter in exactly this way. It is for this reason that I once
said:
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that
the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does
not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference
until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break
his contract if he chooses. 237
But you misunderstand me if you think, that by my uttering these
words, I am condoning the bad man’s behavior. Far from it. 238 I wish to
stop him just as much as you do. It is precisely for this reason that we
must understand how the bad man thinks, so that when his case comes
before the judge, or the law he violated is reconsidered by a legislature, a
judge or legislature will be in a better position to count the bad man’s
“teeth and claws,” and influence him accordingly.

In Holmes’s view, a judge or legislature should not lament the fact that
the bad man thinks and behaves as he does, but embrace it. Put differently,
the lawmaker should realize that the bad man will think in such a morally
despicable way, and must then weigh against the bad man’s behavior the
moral, social, economic, and political importance of requiring parties to
keep their contracts. It must also consider what sort of external sanctions
might be necessary to not only get the bad man to behave as the good man
does, but to think as the good man does (i.e., to become good). In short, the
lawmaker must “consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of
attaining them, and the cost.” 239 If, after undertaking this analysis, the
lawmaker decides, for example, to discourage efficient breach by
stipulating that specific performance shall be the remedy for every breach
of contract, I do not think Holmes would have a problem with this analysis,
and would likely embrace it, so long as it was seen to be in the polity’s best
interest, as they themselves understand their preferences. This, I think, sets
him far apart from the law and economic theorists who would look to
Holmes as the founding father of their movement.
In sum, it is a mistake to view Holmes as pitting the external values of
predictability and efficiency against the internal values of fairness and

237. HOLMES, supra note 47, at 236.
238. See, e.g., Perillo, supra note 54, at 1087 (“Holmes equates a contractual breach with
a tort, which in French means ‘wrong.’ Consequently, in Holmes’s view, the breach of a
contract was as much an offense against the law—a legal wrong—as a tort, not the free
choice that the misinterpreters of Holmes believe he advocated. Indeed, from the bench,
Holmes described a breach of contract as a wrong. In his judicial capacity, he certainly had
approved of the grant of expectancy damages, and had allowed a price action where the
seller had deposited securities in escrow, but the buyer had refused to pay, in essence
requiring specific performance at law.” (footnotes omitted)).
239. Holmes, supra note 3, at 474.
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justice, 240 for he was equally kind to both. Rather, Holmes simply believed
that a focus on the external point of view was more conducive to protecting
and fostering the internal point of view. Focusing on several more
examples from the law of torts and punitive damages should help further
illustrate this point.
2. The Mixed Theory of Torts
Just as contracts scholars have accused Holmes of favoring the amoral
external point of view over the morally based internal point of view,
commentators on tort law likewise have pitted these two theories against
each other 241 and placed Holmes on the side that “envisions humans as
rapacious, selfish beasts, and law as a coercive tool to keep us from
destroying each other.” 242 With such an inauspicious welcome, an apology
on behalf of Holmes seems in order. 243
Behind these attacks exists the assumption that Holmes’s bad man theory
of law is purely external, and the very real fear such theories “undervalue
the internal standpoint.” 244 The concern, in other words, is that if tort law
is viewed merely “as a set of incentives, then the concept of ‘wrong’ tends
to drop out,” and courts will instead choose to impose “liability on the agent
who can avoid the loss at the least cost, regardless of any responsibility for
or connection with the victim.” 245 When courts adopt this behavior, or
when scholars suggest that courts adopt this behavior, this is a very real
danger indeed. But when the bad man adopts this behavior (as he
inevitably does), and when lawmakers seek to understand him for the
purpose of deterring, punishing, or reforming him, what was once to be
feared is now to be embraced. The confusion is created, it seems, by
conflating the descriptive with the normative, and assuming that one giving
an account of the external, bad man view must also necessarily be
advocating the normative acceptance of such a view. But this, as we have
seen, is an idea Holmes clearly rejected. What is necessary here is to
separate in our minds how the bad man himself views the law, and how the
lawmaker who understands the bad man views the bad man. The former, as
240. Linzer, supra note 51, at 139 (“Predictability is an important value in law, as should
be the promotion of economic efficiency. But most important are fairness and justice. If
courts take the amoral approach of Holmes or the second Restatement, defaulting promisors
will often be able to shift costs ignored by the law to promisees, parties who trusted their
promisors and who must now take second best through money damages.”).
241. Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?, 106 YALE L.J. 1269, 1297 (1997) (“One may
either take an ‘external standpoint,’ the ‘bad man’ standpoint mentioned by Holmes, or an
‘internal standpoint,’ the standpoint of a member of a normative community. The first views
law as a set of penalties to be avoided. From this deterrence-based perspective, the law
involves no obligations; it is merely a fact about the world to take into account in making
one’s self-interested decisions. The second understands law as imposing ‘obligations,’ that
is, providing reasons for taking action, which one accepts as important and virtuous.” (citing
HART, supra note 8, at 89–91)).
242. Id. at 1298.
243. The double entendre is intended.
244. Meyer, supra note 241, at 1297.
245. Id.
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we have seen, will be concerned with maximizing his own well being,
whereas the latter will have before its mind the protection of the good man,
and the deterrence, punishment, and/or reform of the bad man.
Consider, again, the famous Learned Hand formula, in which we are told
that negligence liability for a potential tortfeasor will depend on whether
B < PL, where B is the burden or cost of precaution that must be undertaken
by the defendant to prevent an accident, P is the probability of the accident
occurring, and L is the magnitude of the loss.246 In the bad man’s hands,
such a formula will cause the bad man to “pay tort judgments to the
accident victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability”
whenever “the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention.”247
Viewed from the internal, good man perspective, such a rule may seem
morally repugnant, for it suggests that the bad man may decide to roll the
dice and injure innocent victims, whenever it is profitable to do so (i.e.,
whenever it is more expensive to take precautions than it is to pay the cost
of legal liability). Adopting such a standard has been criticized as
“writ[ing] laws for the ‘bad man,’” rather than for the good, 248 and it is easy
to see why such criticisms garner our sympathy.
However, as a descriptive matter, the Learned Hand formula brilliantly
captures how the bad man actually behaves. Our real problems with this
formula, it seems to me, are twofold: first, from the internal perspective,
we lament that there are people who really behave this way; and second,
from an external perspective, we lament the inputs used by the bad man.
The first criticism is easy to understand, but the second requires some
explanation.
All activities engaged in by all people at all times impose some risk on
other parties. And this risk can almost always be reduced by incurring extra
costs. All other things equal, cars that travel twenty-five miles per hour are
safer than cars that travel one hundred miles per hour. All things equal,
diesels driving twenty-five miles per hour are safer than compact cars
driving twenty-five miles per hour. All things equal, diesel drivers wearing
helmets are safer than diesel drivers who do not wear helmets. If we cared
only about reducing risk, we could require every driver to wear a helmet
when driving his or her diesel not more than twenty-five miles per hour.
Yet, we do not do this. Why? Presumably, because diesels are expensive,
driving faster is convenient, and helmets are uncomfortable. The costs, in
short, are too high for the concomitant benefit to be realized.
So far, I take it that nothing I have said is controversial. Yet, change the
facts a little, so that Ford is presented with a decision to spend a few extra
dollars to save a hundred human lives, and such a formula seems repugnant.
246. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.).
247. Posner, supra note 100, at 33.
248. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory & Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
31 (1988) (“The legal standard of care may serve as the minimally acceptable standard of
behavior, failing which one becomes liable. But the standard need not be set at the
minimum—we do not need to follow Justice Holmes’ advice and write laws for the ‘bad
man.’”).
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But, I submit, it is not the formula itself that is repugnant, but the inputs that
bring it to life. What we are really angry about is the fact that PL used by
Ford was too low, because Ford did not value human life highly enough.
This must be the case, because, remember, Ford (and every automobile
manufacturer worldwide) can always reduce the number of accidents by
incurring extra expenses (e.g., making every car with a five inch thick
stainless steel body), but we as a society do not require this because we as a
society do not want to pay a fortune for the cars we drive. 249 Thus, in cases
in which the bad man does not take what the good man would deem
adequate precautions, we should not blame the bad man, but ourselves.
Why?
According to the mixed view, a judge or legislature will begin by
recognizing that a bad man, by definition, behaves as I have described
above. What the judge or legislature need not do, however, is blindly parrot
the bad man’s own analysis, using his inputs, and reaching the same results.
Remember, under the mixed approach, a lawmaker will want to enact laws
that, if followed, will tend to make bad men good, and will want to impose
external sanctions that are sufficiently large to make the bad man follow
such laws. How can this be done? Once again, the lawmaker must
“consider and weigh the ends of legislation, the means of attaining them,
and the cost.” 250 If the bad man is behaving rationally and not taking
precautions where B > PL, but we, as a society, believe that such
precautions should be taken, perhaps on account of some deep sense of
justice, the problem is not with the bad man’s math, but with the way we, as
a society, are pricing his inputs. By taking Holmes’s advice and trying to
tame this particular dragon, we should increase the product of PL by, for
example, increasing the value of human life to the point where we would
agree with the bad man not taking a particular precaution, as when, for
example, all cars must be manufactured with five inch thick stainless steel
bodies. 251
249. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 101, at 1059 n.178 (“[T]he effect of Ford’s avoidance
of those safety precautions was to enable Ford to lower the Pinto’s sales price. The cost
savings, then, were essentially passed on to consumers.”); White, supra note 113, at 131
n.280 (“Though the court views the two dollar expense as coming out of Ford’s corporate
profits, in fact, as economics tells us, and as has been repeatedly verified empirically, any
increases in costs are ultimately passed on to the consumer. Even the legal circles
understand and accept that fact, as is reflected in the courts’ decision to impose strict liability
on the grounds that manufacturers are better able to absorb the risks of harm by passing them
on to consumers through higher prices.”).
250. Holmes, supra note 3, at 474.
251. Id. at 466–67. We should, in short, recognize what Holmes explained over a century
ago, that
the torts with which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of
certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or property by
railroads, factories, and the like. The liability for them is estimated, and sooner or
later goes into the price paid by the public. The public really pays the damages,
and the question of liability, if pressed far enough, is really the question how far it
is desirable that the public should insure the safety of those whose work it uses. . . .
[T]he economic value even of a life to the community can be estimated, and no
recovery, it may be said, ought to go beyond that amount. It is conceivable that
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3. The Mixed Theory of Punitive Damages
Closely linked to the purely external view of tort law is the purely
external view of punitive damages. Ignoring for the moment that such a
view was never what Holmes had in mind, a purely external, bad man view
of punitive damages is nevertheless still misunderstood. As with the
discussion of tort law above, one must again insist on the clear definition of
terms. Specifically, one must be sure to separate the external reasons that
exist to govern the bad man’s behavior (i.e., the quantum and probability of
the external sanctions to be imposed), and the tools at the lawmakers’
disposal to combat such behavior, i.e., the manipulation of these inputs.
In viewing an act exclusively through the lens of the bad man, one would
see that individuals and companies who know exactly what they will have
to pay in damages before undertaking dangerous activities will not have a
financial incentive to reign in those activities whenever paying legal
damages is less expensive (e.g., by taking more care, or by making their
products any safer than absolutely necessary), and this, in turn, would lead
to some difficult to digest outcomes for the good man.
We have already seen an example of this in our discussion of Ford v.
Grimshaw above. There we noted that a “good man” governed by his
“vaguer sanctions of conscious” might hope that Ford would be governed
by such internal considerations as well, and should select the option that
saves human lives. But we also discussed why this analysis was too
simplistic, in that every decision, at some level, is a decision about risk, and
the good man cannot hope to explain why a particular bad man behaves as
he does by recourse to inner morality. Even more troublesome, this
analysis fails to take into account how the bad man actually operates, which
will hinder legislative and judicial efforts to reign in his activity. It is for
this reason, Holmes would argue, that the bad man approach is necessary.
But, under the mixed approach, one must not misunderstand the bad man
approach as one in which the bad man’s activities are facilitated. One must
not, in other words, do as our own Supreme Court has done in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, and ensure that the penalty imposed is “reasonably
predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look
ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course
of action or another.” 252 There is, in short, no need to help the bad man,
and the point of the mixed approach, as discussed above, is merely to
understand the bad man in order to deter, punish, or reform him. And it is
difficult to see how one is adequately deterring the bad man by requiring
that the punitive damages be limited to a 1:1 punitive to compensatory ratio,
and even harder to see how such a ratio would allow courts to punish the

some day in certain cases we may find ourselves imitating, on a higher plane, the
tariff for life and limb which we see in the Leges Barbarorum.
Id. at 467.
252. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (Souter, J.) (citing
Holmes, supra note 3, at 459).
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bad man for his activities. 253 In short, in an unprecedented effort to
accommodate Holmes’s bad man, the Supreme Court seems to have
misunderstood him in the worst possible way, and has allowed him to
become evil, rather than forcing him to behave as though he were good, if
not to become good himself in the process.
But remember that according to the mixed view, Holmes’s bad man
theory is not telling us that this is how the Fords or Exxons of the world
ought to make decisions. Rather, Holmes’s theory is pointing out that this
is how the Fords and Exxons of the world do make decisions, and then
leaving it up to the lawmakers to decide how they will change the inputs
used by the bad man to ensure that these decisions better comport with
public morality. And they can do this, as has been stated before, by putting
on the hat of the “man of statistics and the master of economics,” and by
carefully “consider[ing] and weigh[ing] the ends of legislation, the means
of attaining them, and the cost.” 254 They can, in short, increase the cost of a
party that engages in morally reprehensible behavior by increasing the
availability of punitive damages to punish and deter them, and this is best
accomplished by ensuring that the wrongdoer’s activities comport with
notions of social morality.
In short, under the Aristotelian/Holmesian mixed approach, we ought to
be less powerless than the Supreme Court supposes in our dealings with the
bad man, and Holmes would have been the first to suggest that the good
man be given the power to adequately punish the bad man, and to enact a
penalty sufficient to deter him externally, and reform him internally. 255
CONCLUSION
[The law] has the final title to respect that it exists, that it is not a
Hegelian dream, but a part of the lives of men.

— Oliver Wendell Holmes 256
253. Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2005)
(“Unless punitive damages are available, imposed, and sustained on appeal (a tiny fraction of
cases), tortfeasors can continue to engage in wrongful conduct as long as they are prepared
to pay its costs.” (citing MARK PETERSON, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUB. NO. N2342-IJC, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1985)).
254. Holmes, supra note 3, at 469, 474.
255. Thus, Professor Pierre J. Schlag was quite right to recognize, as a descriptive matter,
that
[b]y specifying a sharp line between forbidden and permissible conduct, rules
permit and encourage activity up to the boundary of permissible conduct. The
application of the same deterrent force to forbidden conduct regardless of how
close or far it may be from permissible conduct, fails to distinguish between
flagrant and technical violations.
Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 384–85 (1985). As a
normative matter, however, we need to “predesig[n]at[e] and quantify[] the magnitude of the
penalty to be applied,” which would “allow Holmes’ proverbial bad man to treat the
deterrent as a fixed cost of doing business,” id., but should give the courts more flexibility
under the mixed approach to take the nature of the violation into account (e.g., flagrant
versus technical violations), and impose a penalty that not only fits the nature of the
violation, but that will deter individuals from engaging in this sort of conduct in the future.
256. Holmes, supra note 3, at 473.
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In this Article, I have traced Holmes’s controversial “bad man” theory of
law from its inception in 1897 to its current manifestations in the fields of
contract law, tort law, and punitive damages jurisprudence, and have shown
that its development, by law and economics scholars and our own Supreme
Court, has unduly focused on the external point of view while ignoring the
internal point of view that the theory was designed to serve. I have also
shown how this view has been mistaken, with devastating consequences in
the fields of contract law, tort law, and punitive damages jurisprudence.
While Holmes undeniably advocated the separation of law and morality, he
did it not to disparage morality, but to strengthen it, by deterring and
reforming the bad man for the sake and protection of the good. In this
regard, Holmes’s thought has much more in common with that of the
inventor of the good man himself, Aristotle, than it does with Bentham’s,
and the analytic separation between law and morality that Holmes
encouraged was more for the benefit of the good man than has previously
been supposed. Indeed Holmes, who is often thought of as the architect of
the bad man paradigm, can better be thought of as a builder bridging the
moral-legal divide and, in the process, allowing for the direct infusion of
morality into legal discourse.

